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THE SCANDAL OF REFUGEE FAMILY 
REUNIFICATION 
Abstract: Headlines have highlighted the plight of unaccompanied children seek-
ing asylum at our southern border. Some political pundits have called this a “cri-
sis,” casting blame for the migrant influx on our outdated and confusing immigra-
tion policies. Yet further away from the border, another group of migrants—all of 
whom have already resettled here—confronts a more routine crisis perpetrated by 
our bureaucracy. Refugees, who are legally resettled in the United States by the 
tens of thousands each year, often arrive without intact family units. Many have 
been forced to leave spouses or children behind in conflict zones or refugee camps. 
To reunite with these loved ones, refugees must petition to bring them through the 
U.S. immigration system via special processes meant to accommodate a refugee’s 
status as a victim of persecution. Yet through stringent documentation requirements 
and bureaucratic inertia, these processes often end up penalizing refugees for their 
lack of resources. Ironically, refugees’ vulnerability and past persecution—which 
form the very basis for their status in the United States—subsequently prevent 
them from navigating an immigration process specially designed for them. This 
Note provides an overview of this complex system and identifies many of the flaws 
that keep refugee families apart. It then offers a number of reforms designed to 
streamline this cumbersome bureaucracy and protect refugees’ family members 
seeking to be reunited on American soil. 
INTRODUCTION 
Esther, a refugee from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was forci-
bly separated from five of her children during civil conflict in the early 2000s.1 
She spent several years in a refugee camp and was eventually resettled to 
North Carolina without her children. Upon arrival in the United States, she 
petitioned the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) to bring 
her children here. USCIS required that Esther provide birth certificates to 
prove her relationship to her children, all minors, but these documents did not 
exist. Incurring months of extra delay, Esther contacted relatives in the Congo 
who procured retroactive documentation of the relationship. 
USCIS then approved the petition and transferred the file to the U.S. Em-
bassy in Kinshasa, Congo’s capital. In order to continue processing, the chil-
dren had to travel to Kinshasa for visa interviews. But the children lived on the 
1 Andrew Haile, Esther’s Story (2012) (unpublished notes) (on file with author) [hereinafter Esther’s 
Story]. This narrative describes the true story of a client of the Humanitarian Immigration Clinic at 
Elon Law School in Greensboro, N.C., where the author previously worked. See id. Names have been 
changed to protect confidentiality. See id.  
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other side of the country, hundreds of miles away, and the journey to Kinshasa 
was extremely dangerous. Esther had no choice, however, and raised money 
from her church to fly them to the capital in a small plane. 
The children, however, had never been to Kinshasa before, and could not 
find a stable place to stay. They had no parent or guardian with them. On the 
day of their interview, they were turned away from the embassy because they 
lacked the requisite paperwork, which was in the United States with Esther. 
Rescheduling the interview took months. During this time, the youngest child, 
Florence, went missing. She is presumed kidnapped or dead, and did not ac-
company her siblings to the United States to be reunited with their mother.  
When the remaining four children received a new interview, they were 
unaccompanied by adults, attorneys, or translators (the oldest child was six-
teen). Despite this, and against all odds, their visas were approved—nearly two 
years after Esther filed the original petition. At last, they were granted permis-
sion to travel to the United States to be reunited to their mother. It was, under-
standably, a bittersweet reunion: to this day, no one knows what happened to 
Florence, a child in pursuit of a visa.2 
Each year, the United States resettles tens of thousands of refugees from all 
over the world.3 Many of these refugees arrive, like Esther, without intact family 
units due to dangerous circumstances in their home countries.4 Upon arrival, 
they may petition the U.S. government to immigrate their spouses and children 
through the federal immigration bureaucracy.5  
Although in place, this system poses significant challenges to refugees, 
many of whom lack formal education and the documentation needed to success-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Id. 
 3 Daniel C. Martin & James E. Yankay, Refugees and Asylees: 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC.: OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANN. FLOW REP., Aug. 2014, at 3, available at http://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/466G-
Q42T. The United States admitted 69,909 refugees in 2013, 58,179 in 2012, and 56,384 in 2011. See 
id. 
 4 See, e.g., Ben Dobbin, Vietnam Refugee, Long-Lost Son Reunite, PHILLY.COM (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://articles.philly.com/2011-11-22/news/30429351_1_vietnam-refugee-thailand-pirate, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y9TE-8SQJ (describing the reunification of a Vietnamese father and son after nearly 
thirty-four years apart); Joe Gamm, Family Torn Apart by War Reunited in Triad, GREENSBORO 
NEWS & REC., Nov. 6, 2013, http://www.news-record.com/news/local_news/article_984d5732-46a6-
11e3-917c-001a4bcf6878.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JKP4-3PXW (detailing the reunification 
of a refugee family from the Central African Republic who was forcibly separated when a rebel group 
stormed their village and burned their house); Refugee Mother and Daughter Reunited After 11 Years 
Apart, INT’L RESCUE COMM., (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.rescue.org/blog/refugee-mother-and-
daughter-reunited-after-11-years-apart, archived at http://perma.cc/92QU-GMQM (outlining the story 
of the reunification of an Eritrean mother and daughter after being apart for over a decade). 
 5 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(2), 1158(b)(3) (2012) (providing the statutory framework for reunifica-
tion); SARAH B. IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW & THE FAMILY § 14:57 
(2013) (outlining the procedure for refugee family reunification). 
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fully navigate the process and be reunified with their loved ones.6 Like Esther, 
many refugees face similar delays, frustrations, and bureaucratic hurdles when 
immigrating their family members.7 Rather than providing refugees with extra 
support and protection, the system often penalizes them for their vulnerability 
and lack of resources.8 This exacerbates refugees’ suffering and keeps many 
families apart.9 
This Note argues that these administrative hurdles make it too hard to reu-
nite refugee families, and that simple changes can be made to streamline the pro-
cess and fix a broken system.10 Part I discusses the refugee family reunification 
system and lays out the process refugees must comply with to immigrate their 
relatives.11 Part II identifies the flaws within the system, including the adjudica-
tion of family petitions and the consular process at U.S. Embassies abroad.12 
Finally, Part III offers solutions to these problems by advocating reform at dif-
ferent stages of the family reunification process.13 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Devon A. Corneal, On the Way to Grandmother’s House: Is U.S. Immigration Policy More 
Dangerous Than the Big Bad Wolf for Unaccompanied Juvenile Aliens?, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 609, 
613–14 (2004) (noting that child refugees are extremely vulnerable and lack the skills to navigate the 
“labyrinth of immigration law”); Michael A. Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children: Detention, 
Due Process, and Disgrace, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 162 (1990) (exploring both the complexi-
ty and difficulty of the refugee family reunification process). Immigration is a complicated process 
and many refugees face challenges in obtaining affordable counsel. Olivas, supra at 162. Indeed, one 
scholar notes that congressional testimony revealed that “a substantial number of asylum seekers filed 
claims that had been completed by taxi drivers who drove them to their hearings.” Id. 
 7 See Gamm, supra note 4, at 1; Jeri Rowe, Happy Endings Are Goal for Immigration Law Clinic, 
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Nov. 29, 2013, http://m.news-record.com/news/local_news/article_
06773707-ad79-59f1-9742-d8093f5d5a49.html?mode=jqm, archived at http://perma.cc/4YM8-TE75 
(detailing the work of the Elon Humanitarian Immigration Law Clinic and highlighting the significant 
struggles that all refugees face in being reunified with family members, even those with legal coun-
sel). 
 8 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(2), 1158(b)(3); DAVID A. MARTIN, THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE 
ADMISSIONS PROGRAM: REFORMS FOR A NEW ERA OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 82 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/DavidMartinReport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/RZ9R-
KKXV (noting that consular officers may allow refugee reunifications to “languish”); Corneal, supra 
note 6, at 113–14 (showing that refugees are extremely vulnerable). 
 9 See Rowe, supra note 7 (“We’ve had some [refugee family reunification cases] where we’ve 
worked on reunifications for five years and nothing is ever resolved, and we’ve had reunifications 
where children die . . . . They are in harm’s way. They’re in a bad place, and unfortunately, it happens 
more than one time.”) (quoting Heather Scavone, Dir., Elon Humanitarian Immigration Clinic). 
10 See infra notes 181–309 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–88 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 89–180 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 181–309 and accompanying text. 
276 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:273 
I. REUNITING LOST FAMILIES: UNDERSTANDING THE REFUGEE FAMILY 
REUNIFICATION SYSTEM 
Some refugees are lucky to arrive in the United States with their families 
intact.14 For others, their arrival on American soil is just the beginning of their 
journey to reunite with loved ones.15 This Part explains how the refugee family 
reunification process works.16 Section A details how many refugees are initially 
selected for resettlement and brought to the United States.17 Section B explains 
how refugees, once resettled, may petition to bring relatives here.18 
A. The Legal Resettlement Process for Victims of Persecution 
The United States grants permanent legal status to immigrants who have 
suffered persecution in their home countries.19 These individuals fall into one of 
two groups: refugees and asylees.20 Although both must prove either past perse-
cution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, refugees are selected for re-
settlement while still outside the country, whereas asylees arrive in the United 
States first and then apply for asylum once in the country.21 Because asylees 
manage to travel to the United States on their own, they tend to have more re-
sources than refugees, who generally lack the means to make the journey of their 
own accord.22 This means that refugees often have more difficulty navigating the 
                                                                                                                           
14 See Martin & Yankay, supra note 3, at 3. 
15 See id.  
16 See infra notes 19–88 and accompanying text.  
17 See infra notes 19–34 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 35–88 and accompanying text. 
 19 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42) (2012); RICHARD STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW 327–31 (2d ed. 
2012). Persecution must be on account of one of five factors: race, religion, political opinion, national-
ity, or membership in a particular social group. See STEEL, supra at 327. 
 20 See STEEL, supra note 19, at 328–29, 332. 
 21 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42); 1158(b)(1) (noting that an alien may be granted asylum if he or she 
meet the statutory definition of a refugee); Martin & Yankay, supra note 3, at 3. In 2013, the United 
States admitted 69,909 refugees and 25,199 asylees. Martin & Yankay, supra note 3, at 3, 6. Refugee 
admission numbers are statutorily mandated to be determined by the President each fiscal year. 
STEEL, supra note 19, at 328. In 2013, for example, the refugee admission ceiling was set at 70,000 
individuals. See Martin & Yankay, supra note 3, at 2. There is no cap on asylee admissions, since the 
number of individuals seeking asylum in a given year may fluctuate dramatically based on current 
events. See STEEL, supra note 19, at 328. For example, the number of Egyptians seeking affirmative 
asylum in the United States more than tripled between 2011 and 2012, likely because of the civil un-
rest and events unfolding from the “Arab Spring” revolution. See Martin & Yankay, supra note 3, at 
6. 
 22 See Matthew E. Price, Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law’s Preference for Persecut-
ed People, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 413, 446 (2006) (“Asylum in Western states is available only to those 
who can make it out of their own country and travel to the West—often by traversing great distances 
at considerable expense. This group is only a small subset of all those who are in need of membership 
abroad, and indeed, may not be the most in need.”) 
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reunification process than asylees because refugees usually lack the resources 
necessary to negotiate the system.23 
Refugees are all resettled through a centralized process coordinated by a 
variety of federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”), the State Department, and the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (“DHHS”).24 They must undergo health screenings, security clearances, 
and cultural orientation overseas.25 After this process is finished, refugees are 
then assigned to one of nine non-profit voluntary agencies, often referred to as 
“VOLAGs,” that help them upon arrival in the United States.26 VOLAG staff 
members greet refugee families at the airport, provide them with initial housing, 
job training, and English classes, and also serve as cultural mediators.27 These 
staff members quickly become the main points of contact for refugee families 
navigating a vast array of cultural and economic challenges.28 
Once in the United States, refugees are eligible for reunification with their 
spouses and unmarried children under twenty-one years old.29 These eligible 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See STEEL, supra note 19, at 332–33 (noting that asylees must already be in the United States 
to apply for asylum status). This Note focuses primarily on refugees, not because asylees do not also 
face family reunification challenges, but because the system’s problems generally create more diffi-
culties for refugees than asylees. See Price, supra note 22, at 446. Asylees tend to be better educated 
and better resourced than most refugees, and thus have more skills and tools at their disposal to help 
their family members navigate the complex immigration bureaucracy. See id.; infra notes 78–88 and 
accompanying text. Thus, although this Note’s reforms would likely help both refugees and asylees 
successfully reunite with eligible family members, its focus remains on refugees because they have 
the most difficulty with the system due to their vulnerability. See infra notes 78–88 and accompanying 
text. 
 24 See Laura P. Lunn, Note, Displaced and Disillusioned: “Free-Case” Refugees and the Gov-
ernment’s Obligation to Facilitate Effective Resettlement, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 833, 842–43 
(2011) (explaining the U.S. government’s role in the resettlement process); U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/index.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XA27-SMAY (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (noting that the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program is comprised of the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 
(“PRM”), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), and the Department of Health and 
Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”)). 
 25 See 8 C.F.R. § 207.1–.2 (2014). 
 26 See id. § 207.2 (c) (noting that “[e]ach applicant must be sponsored by a responsible person or 
organization”); The Reception and Placement Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/index.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/76QF-HLRW (last visit-
ed Jan. 21, 2015). The nine voluntary agencies, or VOLAGs, are primarily faith-based organizations, 
and include the Church World Service, Ethiopian Community Development Council, Episcopal Mi-
gration Ministries, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, International Rescue Committee, US Committee 
for Refugees and Immigrants, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops, and World Relief. Voluntary Agencies, OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 
(July 17, 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/voluntary-agencies, archived at http://
perma.cc/6SXG-G235. 
 27 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 26. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2) (2012). Refugees and asylees may petition to immigrate spouses (to 
whom they were previously married) and unmarried children under twenty-one. See id. 
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family members are not subject to visa quotas like many other immigrants, 
meaning they may immigrate without artificially-imposed wait times.30 This 
policy is good news for refugees, as many are forced to leave family members 
behind in their home countries in unsafe conditions and petition to immigrate 
them later.31 Yet the process often takes years to complete, and requires both 
petitioners and their overseas family members to overcome numerous hurdles 
before reunification is possible.32 Many refugees are not immediately notified of 
their eligibility for reunification, and those that are notified may not be able to 
find or afford legal counsel to assist them.33 This can make the immigration pro-
cess for family members extremely difficult.34 
B. The Regulatory and Procedural Framework for Reunification 
A refugee’s spouse or unmarried children under twenty-one, known in im-
migration terminology as “derivatives,”35 may be overseas or living in the Unit-
ed States without permanent legal status.36 To bring these family members here, 
refugees must undergo a process that begins with the U.S. Citizenship and Im-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Procedures for Filing a Derivative Petition (Form I-730) for a Spouse and Unmarried Chil-
dren of a Refugee/Asylee, 63 Fed. Reg. 3792-01 (Jan. 27, 1998) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 207, 
208, 209), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-01-27/pdf/98-1879.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8QBM-XVXZ (“Derivative benefits for refugees and asylees are intended to expedi-
ently reunite families in order for them to make the difficult transition to a new life with the support of 
their immediate family members by avoiding lengthy delays due to visa quotas.”). 
 31 See Gamm, supra note 4, at 1; Rowe, supra note 7. 
 32 See MARTIN, supra note 8, at 81–84 (highlighting the “dauntingly labor-intensive” nature of 
these cases and the numerous delays and obstacles they face); see also Gamm, supra note 4, at 1 (de-
scribing a case that took nearly four years); Esther’s Story, supra note 1 (detailing a case that took two 
years). 
 33 See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (indicating that aliens in proceedings before the DHS have a right to coun-
sel, but not at the expense of the government); see also Elon University School of Law Establishes 
Humanitarian Immigration Law Clinic, ELON UNIV. SCH. OF LAW (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.elon.
edu/e-net/Article/52926, archived at http://perma.cc/R5MH-6UE3 (“The indigent individuals served 
through the clinic have few, if any, alternatives for legal representation in the region.”) (quoting Helen 
Grant, Professor at Elon University School of Law). 
 34 See 8 C.F.R. § 207.7 (2014) (outlining the requirements for refugee family reunification); 
Gamm, supra note 4, at 1. 
 35 See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2). The petitioner and beneficiary must have been married prior to the 
petitioner’s grant of refugee or asylee status. See id. Similarly, children must have been under twenty-
one years old either at the time of the petitioner’s approval of refugee status or their arrival in the 
United States. See id. Children in utero when the refugee arrives in the United States or the asylee 
receives asylum approval are also eligible for reunification. See 8 C.F.R. § 207.7(c). 
 36 See 8 C.F.R. § 207.7(f); see also Martin & Yankay, supra note 3, at 7 (providing the number of 
refugees who reunited with overseas relatives in 2013). Although the DHS does not publish statistics 
on the breakdown between refugee following-to-join derivatives processed domestically vs. abroad, it 
does maintain these statistics for asylees. See Martin & Yankay, supra note 3, at 7. In 2013, 13,026 
asylee following-to-join derivatives received authorization for travel from overseas, whereas only 
2,240 received following-to-join status while residing domestically. Id. These numbers support the 
conclusion that far more refugee and asylee derivatives undergo the process overseas than domestical-
ly. See id. 
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migration Services (“USCIS”), continues with the U.S. State Department, and 
concludes with a reunification on American soil.37 Subsection 1 discusses the 
first half of the reunification process, where refugees in the United States file a 
petition to apply for reunification.38 Subsection 2 describes the second half of 
reunification, where the petition is forwarded to the relevant US Embassy abroad 
and additional screenings take place.39 
1. The I-730 Approval Process 
Refugees in the United States begin the reunification process by filing 
Form I-730 with USCIS.40 Once a petition is filed, adjudicators in a USCIS Ser-
vice Center in Texas or Nebraska will review the I-730.41 They look for proof of 
the refugee petitioner’s relationship to the beneficiary, which is typically done by 
providing birth or marriage certificates, religious records, photographs, corre-
spondence, or money transfer receipts from remittances sent to the beneficiary 
overseas.42 Officers adjudicate petitions based on the preponderance of the evi-
dence.43 Under this standard, if an officer finds it is more likely than not that the 
claimed relationship exists, he or she will issue an approval, and forward the 
petition to the National Visa Center (“NVC”) in Portsmouth, NH.44 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supra note 5, § 14:57; Ken Smith, Goldsboro Couple Reunited 
with Six Children, WRAL.COM (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/10330148/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/P6NC-XRE5 (telling the story of a joyful airport reunification between a 
Togolese couple and their six children after a long immigration process). 
 38 See infra notes 40–51 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 52–88 and accompanying text. 
 40 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB NO. 1615-
0037, I-730 REFUGEE/ASYLEE RELATIVE PETITION 1 (2015) [hereinafter USCIS, FORM I-730], available 
at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-730.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T3EL-3MSK. 
The term “following-to-join derivative” is employed by the Code of Federal Regulations. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 207.7. An I-730 must be filed within the first two years after the refugee’s arrival in the United States. 
Id. § 207.7(d). Applicants who miss the deadline may request an extension for “humanitarian reasons.” 
Id. The Code of Federal Regulations, however, does not specify what constitutes a “humanitarian rea-
son.” Id. The Director of the Elon Humanitarian Immigration Clinic notes that her clinic has had success 
in getting extensions granted where a petitioner did not know the location of her spouse or child, or 
whether they were alive. Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, Dir., Elon Humanitarian Immigra-
tion Clinic (Nov. 15, 2013) (notes on file with author). Humanitarian extensions have also been granted 
where refugees previously received ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 
 41 See STEEL, supra note 19, at 349; see also USCIS, FORM I-730, supra note 40, at 4 (notifying 
petitioners to file their forms with either the Nebraska or Texas Service Centers, based on place of 
residence). 
 42 See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., OMB No. 1615-0037, 
Form I-730 Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition Instructions 3 (2015) [hereinafter Form I-730 Instruc-
tions], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-730instr.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/P6HK-QK7X; Steel supra note 19, at 349; U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Adjudi-
cator’s Field Manual § 21.10 (2014) [hereinafter AFM]. 
 43 AFM, supra note 42, § 11.1(c). 
 44 Id. Concerns about fraud are real: marriage-based family petitions provide a strong incentive 
for falsifying marriages. See Martin, supra note 8, at 12 (noting that “[s]ome programs, particularly 
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If the adjudicator needs more information or suspects fraud, he or she may 
issue a Request for Evidence (“RFE”) to petitioners.45 These RFEs notify peti-
tioners that their petitions will be denied unless further evidence of the relation-
ship is provided.46 RFEs may come with a heightened standard of proof, mean-
ing refugees must now provide clear and convincing evidence of the claimed 
relationship.47 If a petitioner submits sufficient documentation, the adjudicator 
will issue an approval.48 If, however, the adjudicator is not convinced that the 
petitioner is telling the truth, she will issue either an outright denial or a “Notice 
of Intent to Deny” (“NOID”).49 NOIDs give a petitioner thirty days to rebut the 
impending denial with any last proof of the claimed relationship.50 The entire I-
730 approval process typically takes five or six months, and sometimes much 
longer if USCIS issues RFEs or mandatory security checks take longer than usu-
al to clear.51 
2. The Visa-93 Approval Process 
If and when the I-730 Form is approved, the next phase of the refugee reu-
nification process goes overseas in the Visa-93 approval process.52 Approved 
petitions are first forwarded to the NVC in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.53 
There, the NVC will either hold the file for further processing, such as request-
                                                                                                                           
family-based resettlement programs in West Africa, have been marred by a high level of fraudulent 
claims”). Additional documentary requirements help screen out false marriages and give adjudicators 
more tools for seeing through fraud schemes. See id. 
 45 See AFM, supra note 42, § 10.5(a) (outlining the requirements for issuing Requests for Evi-
dence). 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. § 11.1(c) (informing adjudicators that a higher standard of proof is needed in certain 
cases, including fraudulent marriage claims and derivative citizenship for children born out of wed-
lock). 
 48 See id. § 21.10(e)(1). 
 49 See id. § 10.5(b)(4). 
 50 Id. 
 51 See USCIS Processing Time Information, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. https://
egov.uscis.gov/cris/processTimesDisplayInit.do, archived at https://perma.cc/C2Y4-EG33 (select 
“NSC—Nebraska Service Center” or “TSC—Texas Service Center” then follow “Service Center 
Processing Dates”) (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (currently listing a five month processing time); see 
also Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (noting that cases can take months 
longer if RFEs are issued or security checks take longer than usual). 
 52 See AFM, supra note 42, § 21.10(e)(1). Previously, the U.S. State Department would com-
municate via cable, and cables sent to consulates for derivative asylees and derivative refugees were 
known as “Visas-92” and “Visas-93,” respectively. See id. Although the practice of sending cables has 
long since been discontinued, I-730 petition approvals are still known as “Visas-92 or 93” cases, or 
simply “V-92” or “V-93.” See id. 
 53 See Martin, supra note 8, at 181; Follow-to-Join Refugees and Asylees, BUREAU OF CONSULAR 
AFFAIRS, http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/join-refugees-and-asylees.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/5R93-29NP (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). The NVC serves as a processing 
way-station for most visa petitions filed by immigrants in the United States—this phase is not unique 
to the refugee family reunification process. See STEEL, supra note 19, § 7:36. 
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ing and reviewing additional documents, or forward it directly to the consular 
post at the U.S. Embassy in the beneficiary’s country.54 Once the file arrives at 
the Embassy, beneficiaries are initially responsible for contacting the consulate 
and scheduling a mandatory visa interview.55 
Visa interviews are used to verify the beneficiary’s claimed relationship to 
the petitioner and screen for any possible inadmissibility issues.56 Derivatives 
may be found inadmissible to the United States for a wide variety of reasons, 
including serious illness, past criminal behavior, or links to terrorist groups, 
among others.57 Visa beneficiaries generally lack counsel during these consular 
interviews.58 Moreover, some refugee minors may not have an adult with them.59 
Although consular officers presumably keep notes of these interactions, there is 
typically no record available for petitioners or their counsel to review.60 
If satisfied that the beneficiaries are telling the truth and no inadmissibility 
grounds apply, officers will issue a visa approval and instruct the beneficiaries to 
proceed with the next steps in the visa issuance process.61 If, however, they sus-
pect fraud or detect an inadmissibility issue, officers will decline to issue the visa 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See AFM, supra note 42, § 10.3(g). Whether the NVC holds the file and immediately forwards 
it depends on the beneficiary’s country of residence. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, supra note 
53. 
 55 See 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL app. O § 1004(c) (2014) [hereinafter 
9 FAM]. If the beneficiary does not contact the consulate within sixty days, consular officials are 
instructed to send a “Notice of Interview” to the address on file. See id. 
 56 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012); 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O §§ 706.1–.3. Refugee derivatives 
do not have to prove a history of persecution like their spouses or parents; their ground for admission 
to the United States rests solely on their relationship to the petitioner. See 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. 
O §§ 706.2–.5(A)(d). Thus, consular officers need only ask questions about the beneficiaries’ relation-
ship to the petitioner, and not whether or not they fear living in their home countries. See id. In pro-
cessing V-93 cases, consular officers must follow procedures set forth in Chapter 9 of the Foreign 
Affairs Manual, Appendix O. See generally 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O (providing guidelines for 
interviewing, credibility determinations, inadmissibility waivers, and visa issuance and denial). 
 57 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). Notably, refugees are exempt from the public charge exclusion under the 
Immigration Nationality Act, which bars immigrants needing government assistance (like food stamps 
or Medicaid) from entering the country. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 
185, § 212(a)(4) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)); 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O 
§ 706.2-2. 
 58 See Letter from the Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project to Rachel A. McCarthy, Disciplinary 
Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs. (Mar. 2, 2011) (available 
at http://refugeerights.org/wp-content/files/IRAP_DHS_Comment-_Proposed_Foreign_Law_Student_
Bar.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N887-U9KZ (commenting on “the dearth of attorneys available to 
refugee applicants abroad”); Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (noting that 
none of her clients benefit from counsel during visa interviews). 
 59 See Corneal, supra note 6, at 613–14 (noting the high numbers of unaccompanied refugee mi-
nors); Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (pointing out instances where her 
clients’ minor derivatives had to face the consular process without an adult). 
 60 See 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O § 1004(d). The Foreign Affairs Manual instructs officers to 
record their “case notes” from interviews, but there is no mention of providing these notes or other 
formal records to visa applicants or their counsel if requested. See id. 
 61 See id. app. O § 707 (outlining the steps officers must take following V-93 interviews). 
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and begin the visa denial process.62 At this phase, officers may grant waivers for 
some inadmissibility issues, including public health and certain criminal behav-
ior.63 
If a visa is not issued for one of these reasons, consular officers will inform 
the applicant and return the petition to the USCIS Service Center in the United 
States.64 Officers are not required to inform visa applicants of the reasons for the 
denial; they are only instructed to “inform the applicant in writing that the peti-
tion has been returned to USCIS for reconsideration.”65 They are, however, re-
quired to provide a detailed memorandum to USCIS with “factual and concrete 
reasons” supporting the requested denial.66 
From there, the Service Center in Texas or Nebraska will issue a NOID giv-
ing the petitioner a deadline to rebut the findings of the consular officer.67 This 
process—from consular denial to NOID issuance—can take six months or more, 
pushing the entire reunification process to well over twelve months.68 NOIDs 
generally give a reason for the officer’s denial of the visa and provide space for 
the petitioner to respond to the consulate’s findings.69 Petitioners may respond to 
the NOID with a written rebuttal, which gets reviewed by the Service Center.70 
If the rebuttal is successful, USCIS sends the entire file back to the consulate for 
a re-interview.71 This process can take many more months.72 If denied at the 
Service Center, the petition fails, and reunification is barred.73 
Beneficiaries who receive visa approvals must then undergo more pro-
cessing, including mandatory medical examinations, security clearance checks, 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See id. app. O § 706.2-3. 
 63 See id. app. O § 706.3-2. V-93 applicants may not receive inadmissibility waivers for con-
trolled substance trafficking or issues related to national security, including terrorism, genocide, and 
espionage. See id. app. O § 706.3-1. 
 64 See id. app. O § 706.2-3. 
 65 Id. app. O § 706.2-5(B)(c). There do not appear to be any official instruction on why officers 
do not have to state reasons for the denial. See id. 
 66 Id. app. O § 706.2-5(B)(b). The Foreign Affairs Manual does not give further guidance on the 
meaning of “factual and concrete reasons.” See id. 
 67 See 8 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2013). 
 68 See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40. It is unclear why these consular 
denials take so long to reach the Service Centers for NOID issuance. Id. One practitioner indicates that 
her clinic almost always has to contact the office of a Congressman or Senator for assistance in getting 
the NOIDs issued following a visa denial. Id. 
 69 See 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(b). These explanations are frequently boilerplate or lack specificity (i.e., 
“visa applicant was found not credible”). See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 
40. 
 70 See 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(b). 
 71 See AFM, supra note 42, § 21.10(e)(3). 
 72 See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (noting that her clients have 
often had to wait six months or more to receive a new interview following a successful rebuttal to a 
NOID). 
 73 See AFM, supra note 42 § 21.10(e)(3) (noting there is no appeal from the revocation of Form I-
730). 
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and biometrics verification.74 After these steps have been completed, derivatives 
receive assistance with travel from the International Organization for Migration.75 
The U.S. government fronts the cost of flights and issues a no-interest loan to be 
repaid by beneficiaries at a later date.76 This process, from the visa interview to 
the beneficiary’s arrival in the United States, can also take several months, in-
creasing the total timeline of reunification to eighteen months or more.77 
The entire process can be daunting for overseas spouses or children, who 
tend to have little formal education and money.78 Indeed, it is not clear how 
many refugees actually succeed in navigating the system.79 DHS maintains sta-
tistics for asylee derivative admissions: in 2012, 13,049 visas were issued to 
asylee spouses or children coming to the United States, up from 9,550 in 2011.80 
No records of refugee derivative admissions appear to exist, however, even 
though the United States annually admits more principal refugees than asylees.81 
                                                                                                                           
 74 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O § 707. “Biometrics verification” consists of fingerprinting and 
other identity confirmation procedures. See id. 
 75 Id. app. O § 710. 
 76 See id. app. O §§ 710, 710.4. The refugee travel loan program is controversial. See Michael 
Matza, Refugees to America Often Owe Huge Travel Bills, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 19, 2012, http://
articles.philly.com/2012-03-19/news/31211104_1_refugees-travel-money-families, archived at http://
perma.cc/ZEF8-EN93; Molly Messick, Travel Loans Jeopardize Success for Idaho Refugees, NPR 
STATEIMPACT (May 10, 2012), http://stateimpact.npr.org/idaho/2012/05/10/travel-loans-jeopardize-
success-for-idaho-refugees/, archived at http://perma.cc/G8RC-4XXG. Refugees typically must begin 
making payments six months after arriving in the United States. Refugee Travel Loans Collection, 
U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-
dignity/migrants-refugees-and-travelers/refugee-travel-loans-collection/index.cfm, archived at http://
perma.cc/Z9G9-DBBM (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). For large families, who owe loans for each family 
member’s plane ticket, often for flights from remote locations, the total owed can exceed $10,000. See 
Matza, supra. Supporters of the program argue that loan repayments give refugee families the oppor-
tunity to establish credit and learn personal responsibility. See id. Critics, however, point out that 
refugees struggling to find jobs and learn English may not be able to make payments, thereby hurting 
their credit ratings and making integration more difficult. See id. They also claim that many refugees 
are not fully aware of what responsibilities the loan agreements impose on them when they sign prom-
issory notes as a condition to resettlement. See Messick, supra. 
 77 See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (providing an estimate on the 
time frame based on her program’s current work on I-730 cases). The State Department and USCIS do 
not publish average processing times for overseas V-92 or V-93 cases. See I-730 Following-to-Join 
Processing Guide, UNCHR WASH. 20 http://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/rs_i730.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EXG3-HSMX (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (noting that the length of 
time for each case “varies according to its circumstances, and cannot be predicted with any accura-
cy”). 
 78 See Gamm, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that a refugee petitioner had to draw by hand a map of 
her village to assist the Red Cross in locating her missing family members). 
 79 See Martin & Yankay, supra note 3, at 3–7 (declining to provide statistics for the number of 
refugee derivative arrivals in the United States). 
 80 See id. at 7. 
 81 See id. at 4, 6 (indicating that in 2012 the United States admitted 58,179 refugees compared 
with 29,484 asylees). The DHS statistics do indicate the number of admitted refugee dependents, but 
this figure denotes those refugee spouses and children who arrived with the principal applicant, not 
284 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:273 
Moreover, we should be careful in extrapolating refugee derivative numbers 
from those of asylee derivatives.82 Principal asylees must independently make 
their way to the United States and then apply for asylum.83 This often requires 
money, status, and a certain amount of sophistication.84 As a result, asylees often 
tend to be better educated and better resourced than their refugee counterparts, 
many of whom can languish in refugee camps for years.85 Because of this, 
asylees are in a better position to help their spouses and children navigate the 
complexities of the I-730 and V-92 systems.86 The fact, therefore, that over 
13,000 asylee derivatives were admitted to the United States in 2012 is not a 
predictor of the number of refugee derivatives that were admitted.87 Indeed, giv-
en the challenges refugees face in negotiating the system, refugee reunification 
numbers are likely significantly lower.88 
II. GOOD INTENTIONS, POOR EXECUTION: THE FLAWS IN THE  
I-730 AND V-93 SYSTEM 
Although refugees that make it to the United States have the right to peti-
tion to become reunited with their family, the bureaucratic hurdles to reunifica-
tion can frequently endanger those the system is designed to protect.89 Refugee 
derivatives often live in conflict zones or refugee camps, most lack education 
                                                                                                                           
those “following-to-join” beneficiaries who were petitioned for once the principal applicant arrived. 
See id. at 3. 
 82 See id. at 4, 6. 
 83 STEEL, supra note 19, at 332–33 (noting that “asylum is a status granted to someone who has 
been admitted or who is seeking admission into the United States who also meets the definitional 
standard of refugee”). 
 84 See Price, supra note 22, at 446. 
 85 See id.; Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (pointing out that refugee 
derivatives are more likely to be in positions of long-term confinement, like refugee camps, which can 
make it more difficult to obtain civil documentation). 
 86 See Price, supra note 22, at 446; Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40. 
 87 See Martin & Yankay, supra note 3, at 7. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See, e.g., Lee Harper, Syrian Women in Jordan at Risk of Sexual Exploitation at Refugee 
Camps, GUARDIAN, Jan. 24, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jan/24/
syrian-women-refugees-risk-sexual-exploitation, archived at http://perma.cc/9KGR-CKPL (detailing 
the dire circumstances faced by Syrian refugees in the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan); David Ve-
selenak, After 10 Year Wait, Kenyan Refugee Finally Reunited with Family in Michigan, GRAND RAP-
IDS PRESS (June 11, 2010) http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2010/06/after_10_
year_wait_kenyan_refu.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NCJ5-V26M (detailing how a refugee’s 
family member died in a refugee camp after delays with the reunification process). Pro Bono Success-
es and Awards: Happy Family Reunification in the United States for Iraqi Refugee Client After Long 
Legal Struggle, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.orrick.com/
News/Pages/Happy-Family-Reunification-in-the-United-States-for-Iraqi-Refugee-Client-After-Long-
Legal-Struggle.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/393S-7SKF (“Greg confronted every hurdle in this 
case: the slow-moving bureaucracy that is our immigration system, challenges in communicating with 
his client, and fears about his client’s physical and mental health.”). 
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and sophistication with Western legal systems, and few have access to lawyers 
during the reunification process. 90 Furthermore, many refugee children do not 
have a stable parent or guardian with them since their parent or parents are either 
dead, absent, or in the United States.91 This means that many minors must learn 
to advocate for themselves to get their visas approved, or potentially face per-
manent separation from their parents.92 
This Part identifies the ways that the U.S. refugee reunification system not 
only fails to adequately accommodate these vulnerable beneficiaries, but directly 
endangers them and hinders reunification.93 First, Section A identifies problems 
facing refugee petitioners in the United States, stemming from fundamental 
problems within VOLAGs and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”).94 Next, Section B exposes challenges for visa beneficiaries overseas, 
arising out of issues with consular processing and the State Department.95 Final-
ly, Section C discusses the doctrine of consular non-reviewability, which shields 
consular decisions from judicial review in the U.S. federal courts.96 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Crystal J. Gates, Immigration Project, Working Toward a Global Discourse on Children’s 
Rights: The Problem of Unaccompanied Children and the International Response to Their Plight, 7 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 299, 318 (1999) (noting that refugee children who “survive the exodus 
are generally abused and exploited: some are passed from one family to another and others [lack] such 
basics as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and education”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Megan E. Kures, Note, The Effect of Armed Conflict on Children: The Plight of Un-
accompanied Refugee Minors, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 141, 145 (2001) (noting that 
“[h]umanitarian agencies and receiving nations frequently herd unaccompanied refugee minors into 
holding camps, which are places where traditional social protection systems are non-existent”); Access 
to Legal Counsel, IRAQI REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, http://refugeerights.org/policy-impact/
access-to-legal-counsel/, archived at http://perma.cc/M99P-R7VA (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (advo-
cating for an increase in legal representation for refugees applying for resettlement to the United 
States). 
 91 See Gates, supra note 90, at 317 (highlighting the increasing number of unaccompanied minor 
refugee children); Kures, supra note 90, at 145 (indicating the high number of unaccompanied minors 
and the perilous conditions that often separate parents from children); see also Smith, supra note 37 
(describing the events around a Togolese couple who were separated for years from their six children 
due to civil conflict). 
 92 See Gates, supra note 90, at 317; Kures, supra note 90, at 145; see also Smith, supra note 37 
(noting that a couple’s six children were separated from their parents and had to undergo visa pro-
cessing by themselves). 
 93 See infra notes 97–180 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 97–126 and accompanying text. 
 95 See infra notes 127–173 and accompanying text. 
 96 See infra notes 174–180 and accompanying text. 
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A. Starting Off on the Wrong Foot: Challenges for Refugee  
Petitioners in the United States 
1. The Lack of Notice to Refugees of Reunification Benefits 
Although all refugees are entitled to the benefits of reunification, many 
times no one informs refugees that they are eligible for reunification.97 When 
they arrive in the United States, refugees are placed with VOLAGs for daily as-
sistance.98 Many of these organizations, however, do not have legal assistance 
programs and focus their energies on refugees’ immediate needs like paying rent, 
finding a job, and learning English.99 As a result, refugees may not have anyone 
tell them about reunification benefits or to provide them with immigration legal 
assistance.100 
The two-year filing deadline for initiating the reunification process through 
Form I-730 can also pose problems.101 Refugees might not ever be notified of 
their eligibility to file for their spouses or children, and consequently miss the 
deadline.102 This could mean permanent separation from their spouses or chil-
dren, or, at minimum, a much longer wait for reunification via the more restrict-
ed family-based immigration system.103 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Olivas, supra note 6, at 162 (remarking that, at least in the asylum context, “most aliens 
never know the different options available to them”); Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, 
supra note 40 (explaining that some refugees arrive without having been informed of their immediate 
eligibility for family reunification benefits). Affirmative asylees receive notice of reunification bene-
fits after they receive asylum; refugees are not given similar notice. See Telephone Interview with 
Heather Scavone, supra note 40. 
98 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 26. 
 99 See J. James Christian & Kyrsten Sinema, Lives in Transition: The Global Refugee Community 
and Arizona’s Response, 43 ARIZ. ATT’Y 38, 40 (2007) (“In addition to monetary support, newly 
admitted refugees are often in need of all sorts of everyday items, including things as simple as tooth-
brushes and as practical as beds and other furniture.”); Jason Miller, SNAP: Praise the Lord Who Lifts 
Up the Poor, IGNATIAN SOLIDARITY NETWORK (Sept. 24, 2013), http://ignatiansolidarity.net/blog/
2013/09/24/snap-praise-the-lord-who-lifts-up-the-poor/, archived at http://perma.cc/WF4F-HRLM 
(noting that the author, a member of the Jesuit Volunteer Corps working for Catholic Charities in 
Nashville, TN, spent time helping refugees with getting social security cards and finding jobs); see 
also Alan Robertson, A Day in the Life of . . . A Refugee Integration Caseworker, GUARDIAN, June 21, 
2013, http://www.theguardian.com/social-care-network/2013/jun/21/day-in-life-refugee-integration-
caseworker, archived at http://perma.cc/WT4L-HKCR (providing a glimpse into the busy life of a 
Scottish refugee caseworker and noting that one has 170 clients). 
 100 See Olivas, supra note 6, at 162; Miller, supra note 99 (noting that caseworkers are “over-
worked” and often need to “be in two places at once”). 
 101 See 8 C.F.R. § 207.7(d) (2014). It is not clear why a two-year filing deadline is imposed for I-
730s. See id. 
 102 See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (stating that many petitioners 
contact the Elon clinic for assistance after the two-year deadline has already passed).  
 103 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Rationing Family Values in Europe and America: An Immigration 
Tug of War Between States and Their Supra-National Associations, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 807, 809 
(2011) (noting that many restrictions on family-based immigration are designed to “ration” family 
immigration, including “quotas” and “express waiting periods”). But cf. 8 C.F.R. § 207.7(d) (allowing 
applicants who miss the deadline to request an extension for “humanitarian reasons”). 
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2. The Lack of Immigration Legal Services for Refugee Family Reunification 
Cases 
Before tackling the hurdles within the refugee family reunification system, 
many petitioners face an even more basic problem: they cannot find qualified 
legal counsel to help with the process.104 Many VOLAGs lack the funds to have 
an attorney on staff to handle immigration matters, despite the fact that all refu-
gees arriving in the United States have near-immediate immigration legal 
needs.105 Some agencies have non-attorneys serving as accredited representa-
tives certified by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to provide immi-
gration legal services.106 Yet many of these representatives provide immigration 
services only part-time due to funding, and many lack the legal training to han-
dle complex legal matters, such as Requests for Evidence (“RFEs”) and Notices 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See, e.g., Denny Chin, Representation of the Immigrant Poor: Upstate New York, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 351, 353 (2011) (describing the lack of legal services available to immigrants in 
upstate New York); Olivas, supra note 97, at 162 (describing the need for immigration services for 
unaccompanied minor refugees); ELON UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, supra note 33 (highlighting the over-
whelming need for immigration services for refugees in central North Carolina).  
 105 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2012) (requiring refugees to adjust their status after one year). 
The statute indicates that refugees who have been present in the United States for one year and whose 
admission has not been terminated by DHS “shall . . . return or be returned to the custody of the De-
partment of Homeland Security for inspection and examination for admission to the United States as 
an immigrant.” Id. Put simply, all refugees are statutorily mandated to apply for an adjustment of the 
status exactly one year after their arrival in the United States. See id. This mandate is challenging, 
since, practically speaking, not all refugees can apply for a green card after one year in the United 
States, as they lack the expertise and often have no legal counsel. Cf. Chin, supra note 104, at 353 
(describing the lack of legal services for immigrants in New York). Like notice of reunification bene-
fits, some refugees are not properly informed about the need to adjust their status. See id. And there is 
no clear punishment or sanction for non-compliance with the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(§ 209(a)), which creates further confusion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a). Some refugees have been de-
tained for failing to adjust status, despite the fact that they possessed legal status and had not other-
wise committed any immigration violations. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JAILING REFUGEES: ARBI-
TRARY DETENTION OF REFUGEES IN THE U.S. WHO FAIL TO ADJUST TO PERMANENT RESIDENT STA-
TUS 4 (2009) (decrying the detention of unadjusted refugees for numerous reasons, including refu-
gees’ legal immigration status, past history of persecution, frequent lack of knowledge about the need 
to adjust status, disruption of refugee family life and employment, and the high cost). This should only 
underscore the need for increased legal representation of refugees with green card applications and 
other pressing immigration benefits. See id. 
 106 See 8 C.F.R. § 292.2; Recognition and Accreditation (R&A) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ra.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/9KXF-DHNV (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). The BIA Accreditation program represents a great 
opportunity to expand access to immigration counsel for refugees and immigrants. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 292.2. One recent initiative, the Immigrant Justice Corps, which expands access to counsel for im-
migrants in removal proceedings in New York City, plans to employ dozens of BIA-Accredited Rep-
resentatives to provide skilled support to its team of attorneys. See Community Fellowship, IMMI-
GRANT JUSTICE CORPS, http://justicecorps.org/fellowship/, archived at http://perma.cc/C2SY-6QD8 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
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of Intent to Deny (“NOIDs”).107 Moreover, few law firms provide pro bono as-
sistance for refugee family reunification cases.108 This has created a real chal-
lenge in legal representation for refugees, as most cannot afford to hire a private 
immigration attorney to assist with reunification.109 
3. The Challenge of Stringent Documentation Requirements 
Stringent documentation requirements can also impede reunification be-
cause primary documents establishing a relationship often do not exist.110 And 
the procedure for proving relationship is strict: refugees must establish the 
claimed relationship to a USCIS adjudicator and a consular officer overseas.111 
These officers look for proof of the relationship through primary documentation 
such as marriage or birth certificates.112 Presently, refugees lacking primary doc-
umentation may submit secondary documentation like religious or school rec-
ords, along with a statement from the “appropriate civil authority” that the re-
quested primary documentation does not exist.113 Where secondary evidence is 
unavailable, refugees may submit affidavits from third parties—often other refu-
gees—with knowledge of the relationship.114  
                                                                                                                           
 107 See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (explaining that, although fill-
ing out I-730s is not that difficult in itself, drafting briefs to rebut the government’s claims of fraud 
requires a significant amount of legal skill and training). 
 108 See id. Conversely, many law firms take pro bono asylum cases. See, e.g., Associate Story—
Jennifer Greenberg, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, http://www.lw.com/joinus/associatestory/jennifer
greenberg, archived at http://perma.cc/VX9E-9JKM (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (highlighting the pro 
bono asylum case handled by an associate); Political Asylum and Immigrants’ Rights Project, SIDLEY 
AUSTIN LLP, http://www.sidley.com/Political-Asylum-and-Immigrants-Rights-Project/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RE7J-FAQR (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (describing the immigrant victims pro bono 
work performed by the firm); Pro Bono, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP (last visited Jan. 24, 2015), 
http://www.wc.com/probono.html, archived at http://perma.cc/RVK7-GNYE (detailing the firm’s 
work on asylum cases). Certain non-profit organizations, like the Tahirih Justice Center, focus a large 
part of their practice on referring asylum cases to firms for pro bono assistance. See Pro Bono Attor-
ney Network, TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR. http://www.tahirih.org/services/our-attorney-network/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/MX9G-9K4J (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). It is not clear, however, that any organiza-
tions have established similar outreach to firms for assistance with refugee family reunification cases. 
See id.  
 109 See ELON UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, supra note 33 (highlighting the lack of affordable counsel for 
refugees in North Carolina).  
 110 See Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2005) (commenting on the diffi-
culty of asylum-seekers in obtaining documentation); FORM I-730 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 42, 
at 4 (acknowledging that many documents may not be available). 
 111 See AFM, supra note 42, § 21.10; 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O § 700; MARTIN, supra note 
8, at 81.  
 112 See FORM I-730 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 42, at 3. 
 113 See id. at 4. The Form Instructions do not define the term “appropriate civil authority.” See 
id. Presumably it means the national or local government where the refugee is from. See id. 
 114 See id. These provisions do offer viable alternatives to providing primary civil documentation, 
which may be unavailable or dangerous to procure. See Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 612–13; Bolanos-
Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that refugees cannot be expected to 
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USCIS maintains this documentation requirement to combat immigration 
fraud.115 Because immigrants may gain legal status in the United States through 
family ties, they face strong incentives to falsify relationships.116 To counter this, 
the government has established stringent evidentiary requirements.117 Although 
the government rightly seeks to deter fraud, it is clear that these evidentiary 
measures can pose serious obstacles to refugees with bona fide relationships.118 
Many refugees fleeing or living in conflict zones do not have access to pri-
mary or secondary documents, and many cannot approach their government per-
secutors to obtain these documents.119 Moreover, many refugee-producing coun-
                                                                                                                           
procure documentation from their former persecutors); Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, 
supra note 40 (highlighting the difficulties her clients have in obtaining primary documentation). 
 115 See David A. Martin, A New Era for U.S. Refugee Resettlement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 299, 312 (2005); see also AFM, supra note 42, §§ 10–11 (detailing numerous anti-fraud and 
evidentiary measures for USCIS adjudicators). 
 116 See Martin, supra note 115, at 312. Although the author focuses primarily on the refugee re-
settlement program, his thoughts provide insight on the reunification system as well: 
In any selective system, fraud is an inescapable problem. After all, resettlement usually 
represents major gains in life prospects, often well beyond even what the nondisplaced 
local population living near the refugees could ever reasonably expect. Hence the temp-
tation to lie is great. Out of desperation or manipulation, or based on the coaching of an 
entrepreneur collecting a fee for such advice, applicants for resettlement may tailor their 
stories to fit what they understand to be the requirements of the program (often called 
the “camp story” problem)—as a great many persons interviewed for this study took 
pains to emphasize. Importantly, these warnings about the likelihood of fraud in con-
nection with a resettlement program were heard at least as often and as vehemently 
from humanitarian workers as they were from persons with enforcement roles. 
Id. Outside the refugee context, concerns about fraud in obtaining lawful permanent resident cards—
often referred to as “green cards”—have existed for years. See Nina Bernstein, Do You Take This Immi-
grant?, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2010, at MB1 (providing a fascinating look at the measures couples must 
go through to receive marriage-based green cards); Laila Hlass, Congress Cries Wolf on Asylum Fraud, 
Op-Ed, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/03/07/congress-cries-
wolf-asylum-fraud/LpwsimgjQU2Ps8mQyIOCeJ/story.html#, archived at http://perma.cc/R6VP-2MQK 
(acknowledging immigration fraud enforcement as proof that the system works as it should, not that it is 
fundamentally broken). 
 117 See 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O § 706.2-5 (providing consular officers with instructions on 
how to identify and respond to fraud). 
 118 See Janice D. Villiers, Brave New World: The Use and Potential Misuse of DNA Technology 
in Immigration Law, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 239, 249 (2010) (noting the high potential for fraud 
in immigration law); Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (highlighting the 
overwhelming difficulty her clients have in obtaining documents to prove relationships). 
 119 See Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 614 (overturning the BIA’s denial of an Egyptian asylum claim). 
The court uses strong language to describe the challenges of refugees procuring documentation to 
establish their claims: 
Many asylum applicants flee their home countries under circumstances of great urgen-
cy. Some are literally running for their lives and have to abandon their families, friends, 
jobs, and material possessions without a word of explanation. They often have nothing 
but the shirts on their backs when they arrive in this country. To expect these individu-
als to stop and collect dossiers of paperwork before fleeing is both unrealistic and strik-
ingly insensitive to the harrowing conditions they face. 
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tries do not maintain comprehensive systems of record-keeping; even without 
conflict, civil documents may be unreliable and hard to get.120 Under these cir-
cumstances, it is even more difficult to expect refugees fleeing violence to be 
able to procure the appropriate civil documentation.121 
These practical matters confound many refugees seeking reunification with 
loved ones.122 The requirement of rigid documentary proof can often result in 
endangerment to derivatives, particularly minors.123 Children or other relatives 
may be forced to approach hostile government agents to obtain documents.124 
This may alert these governments to the child’s desire to immigrate to the United 
States, resulting in extortion, intimidation, or even violence.125 Even if procuring 
a document itself does not invite direct harm, the process can be formidably ex-
pensive and time-consuming, delaying reunification and leaving the child sepa-
rated from their parent in possibly dangerous conditions.126 
                                                                                                                           
Id. at 612–13; cf. Kures, supra note 90, at 145 (noting that some refugee minors can even have their 
documents confiscated upon arrival in holding camps); Howard W. French, Liberia’s War Refugees Now 
United in Misery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/17/world/liberia-s-war-
refugees-now-united-in-misery.html, archived at http://perma.cc/X9BE-KPQJ (describing the miserable 
conditions many Liberian refugees were forced to endure during Liberia’s civil war). 
 120 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS § 204.2 (2014), 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/iframe/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-53690.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3ADJ-XYZG (laying out procedures for what to do if civil documents are 
unavailable in a country). 
 121 See id.; see also Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 612–13 (highlighting the impracticality of immigrants 
fleeing persecution to stop and collect civil documents). 
 122 See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (detailing the struggles of her 
clients in obtaining documentary evidence from conflict zones or former government persecutors). 
 123 See Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285 (granting asylum to an asylum-seeker from El Sal-
vador whose life was threatened by guerrillas and commenting on rigid documentation requirements 
in immigration proceedings). The court discusses the dangerous conditions faced by asylum-seekers 
and the impracticality of applicants approaching their former government persecutors for proof of 
persecution. See id.  
 124 See id.; see also Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 612–13 (discussing the difficulty in acquiring proper 
documentation). 
 125 See Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 502 (7th Cir. 2004) (underscoring that obtaining doc-
umentation can be dangerous for refugees and asylum-seekers); Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285 
(highlighting the danger of obtaining documents from oppressive governments). The Seventh Circuit 
made clear that documentary requirements must be “reasonable”: 
No matter what form of corroboration is at issue, the corroboration requirement should 
be employed reasonably. It is always possible to second-guess the petitioner as to what 
evidence would be most cogent, and, consequently, there is a distinct danger that, in 
practice, the corroboration requirement can slip into “could have-should have” specula-
tion about what evidence the applicant could have brought in a text-book environment. 
Balogun, 374 F.3d at 502. 
 126 See Kures, supra note 90, at 145 (noting that the “interim period” between separation and 
reunification is “extremely bleak” for many derivatives); UNHCR WASH., supra note 77 (declining to 
provide a timeframe for reunification because the length of time “cannot be predicted with any accu-
racy”). Refugees can often languish in camps for years and years. See French, supra note 119 (provid-
ing an example of refugee camps becoming long-term living situations). For example, Nepali refugees 
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B. The Problems Continue: Challenges for Visa Beneficiaries Overseas 
1. Lack of Accommodation for Unaccompanied Minor Derivatives 
With so many refugees affected by conflict and hardship, unaccompanied 
minor derivatives present one of the most pressing difficulties for family reunifi-
cation.127 Children separated from their parents are often the most in need of 
swift reunification.128 Many languish in camps without supervision or structured 
education; many are at high risk for juvenile delinquency, unwanted pregnancy, 
or disease; some are even in physical danger from conflict, disasters, or direct 
persecution.129 Yet, ironically, their indisputable neediness directly hurts their 
chances of getting their visas approved because they are not effective self-
advocates.130 
Esther’s story, highlighted in the introduction, illustrates the problem.131 
There, the children needed sustained, direct advocacy with the consulate to even 
accomplish a simple task like getting an interview scheduled—let alone navigate 
the rest of the visa process.132 Esther’s legal counsel spent hours emailing and 
calling the U.S. Embassy, providing requested documentation, and prodding of-
ficers to take action on the case.133 Without this advocacy, it is unlikely the chil-
                                                                                                                           
forced to flee their home country of Bhutan during an ethnic purge in 1990 spent over twenty years in 
camps because Nepal refused to take them in. See Kyle Knight, How Do You Get from Kathmandu to 
L.A.? Wrong! Bhutan Refugees Learn the Ins and Outs of Air Travel, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Feb. 14, 
2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/how-do-you-get-kathmandu-la-wrong-bhutan-refugees-learn-ins-outs-
air-travel-1554497, archived at http://perma.cc/Q448-YGVS. 
 127 See Kures, supra note 90, at 155 (calling the lack of protection for unaccompanied refugee 
minors an “inexcusable tragedy”); Olivas, supra note 6, at 162 (noting that without help, unaccompa-
nied refugee children simply do not have the tools to navigate the legal process by themselves); Es-
ther’s Story, supra note 1. 
128 See Olivas, supra note 6, at 162, 63. 
 129 See Gates, supra note 90, at 300. For many unaccompanied refugee children, arriving in the 
relative safety of a refugee camp does not mean their troubles are over: 
Despite the fact that many unaccompanied children confront additional risks of murder, 
torture, rape . . . imprisonment, abduction, enslavement, robbery, and starvation, the 
loss of family care and protection is perhaps the greatest loss to these children. Thus, 
even when they reach the apparent safety of a refugee or displaced person camp, their 
problems—physical, mental, material, and cultural—may be far from over. 
Id. (quotations omitted); cf. Kures, supra note 90, at 145 (highlighting stories of “extreme violence” 
and “mass rape” of unaccompanied refugee minors in refugee camps); Barry Bearak, Zimbabwe’s 
Children Become Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/24/world/
africa/24iht-zimbabwe.1.19642607.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/W5R4-AWC4 
(“[Zimbabwean refugee children] bear the look of street urchins, their eyes on the prowl for useful 
scraps of garbage and their bodies covered in clothes no cleaner than a mechanic’s rags.”). 
 130 See Olivas, supra note 6, at 162 (explaining that unaccompanied children are vulnerable due to 
conflict, stress, predators, and the complexity of immigration law, among other factors). 
 131 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 132 See Esther’s Story, supra note 1. 
 133 See id. 
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dren would have managed to bring their case to the consulate’s attention.134 Even 
with this advocacy, one of the children went missing, is presumed dead, and was 
never reunified with her mother.135  
From the perspective of the consulate, although this scenario is regrettable, 
it is defensible.136 Faced with large case backlogs and rampant fraud, consular 
officers simply do not have the time to focus extra energy on one single case.137 
As a result, those visa beneficiaries with the greatest self-advocacy tools tend to 
be prioritized over the more vulnerable.138 This is not necessarily the fault of 
consular officers, most of whom are conscientious, highly trained public serv-
ants.139 Officers’ staggering caseloads prevent them from giving individualized 
attention to the most vulnerable.140 And unaccompanied refugee minors, far 
away from their parents, are surely among the most vulnerable and least capable 
visa beneficiaries that consulates see.141  
                                                                                                                           
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. 
 136 See id.; see also MARTIN, supra note 8, at 82 (highlighting the numerous tasks of consular offic-
ers and the fact that many do not manage to find the time to prioritize refugee reunification cases). 
 137 See MARTIN, supra note 8, at 82 (remarking that the V-93 process is unfamiliar to some con-
sular officers, and may be “more daunting” and “labor-intensive,” leaving some V-93 applications 
“languishing for many months on a desk in the consulate”); James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa 
Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1, 54 (1991) (noting that, because of high caseloads, 
consular officers often do not have time to devote much attention to individual cases). 
 138 See MARTIN, supra note 8, at 82; Corneal, supra note 6, at 613–14 (“Child refugees are the 
most vulnerable population under UNHCR’s mandate. Unaccompanied or separated children, because 
they are alone or in the company of adults focused on exploiting them, are even more vulnerable. 
These children lack someone to speak for their interests, to negotiate the labyrinth of immigration law, 
and to ensure that they are well cared for.”). 
 139 See Nafziger, supra note 137, at 53–54 (“Consular officers are well trained, representing one 
of the most carefully selected, career-groomed corps of government, the Foreign Service. Consular 
officers possess high levels of competence and morale. Most officers have had special training in the 
visa process and are familiar with the characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the local culture. They 
generally have an experienced eye for fraud and chutzpah by applicants.”); Opportunities, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, http://careers.state.gov/work/opportunities, archived at http://perma.cc/5H7W-F2FZ (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2015) (“The U.S. Department of State employs adventurous, adaptable, well-rounded 
strategic problem-solvers, from diverse educational, geographic, and cultural backgrounds and per-
spectives, with a desire to make a contribution to our global society.”). But see MARTIN, supra note 8, 
at 82 (observing that some consular officers are not familiar with the specialized steps needed to com-
plete V-93 processing). 
 140 See Nafziger, supra note 137, at 54. 
 141 Dennis McNamara, Dir., Div. of Int’l Prot., UNHCR: A Human Rights Approach to the Protec-
tion of Refugee Children, Statement Before London Sch. of Econ. (Nov. 14, 1998) (available at http://
www.unhcr.org/42a00a6c2.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4PB2-A74P). Mr. McNamara’s statement 
provides insight into the vulnerability of refugee minors: 
Refugee children suffer a form of double jeopardy. A denial of their human rights made 
them refugees in the first place; and as child refugees they are also frequently abused, 
as the most vulnerable category of an already vulnerable population. When they cross a 
border to flee persecution or conflict, refugee children often lose whatever social or fa-
milial protection they enjoyed at home. Established support systems, such as schools, 
break down and traditional family structures often collapse with flight. Tragically, the 
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2. Challenges with Visa Denials 
The visa denial process also creates significant hurdles for refugees.142 A 
number of denial procedures, likely adopted for efficiency or fraud prevention, 
makes the process opaque and time-consuming.143 For example, if consular of-
ficers suspect fraud or inadmissibility, they must physically return a case file to 
the USCIS Service Center back in the United States, a process that can take 
months.144 This may be done without any supervisory review or in-country ap-
peals process, or even notification to the applicant of why the visa is getting de-
nied.145 Thus, applicants leave the visa interview without knowing what happens 
next, and then wait for months until petitioners in the United States discover that 
the case is being denied.146 
This approach creates problems because apparent discrepancies in an appli-
cant’s testimony may have legitimate explanations that could be easily clari-
fied.147 For example, foreign cultures often have more expansive concepts of 
family than in the West, meaning refugee children may refer to various relatives 
as parents or siblings even when they are not biologically related.148 Additional-
ly, many refugee minors, separated from their parents, have spent months or 
years living with various other relatives.149 Consular officers undoubtedly re-
ceive training on these cultural differences, but nonetheless deny visas because 
                                                                                                                           
risk of human rights violations against refugee children therefore does not end at the 
crossing of international borders, even where they may have left behind them a series of 
traumatic experiences. 
Id. 
 142 See 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O § 706.2-3 (outlining procedures for visa denial, including 
sending the file back to the USCIS Service Center without requiring supervisory review); Donald S. 
Dobkin, Challenging the Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability in Immigration Cases, 24 GEO. IM-
MIGR. L.J. 113, 113 (2010) (commenting on the opacity of the visa denial processes). 
 143 See 9 FAM, supra note 55, appx. O § 706.2-3; Dobkin, supra note 142, at 113. 
 144 See 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O § 706.2-3 to -5(B). It is not entirely clear why the transfer 
of files back to the United States takes so long. See id. 
 145 See id. The FAM requires that applicants get a notice that their file is being returned to the 
United States for “reconsideration,” but no explanation of the reasons for the reconsideration. See id. 
 146 See id.; Dobkin, supra note 142, at 113. Interviews can last as little as 10 minutes and consist 
of a handful of pre-prepared questions about a beneficiary’s relationship to the petitioner. See Tele-
phone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40. 
 147 See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (describing a case where a visa 
applicant referred to an aunt as a “mother” because he lived with her, despite the fact that his biologi-
cal mother was the petitioner, who lived in the United States). 
 148 See Mwizenge S. Tembo, The Traditional African Family 3 (1988) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://people.bridgewater.edu/~mtembo/menu/articles/TraditionalAfricanFamily.shtml, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/96KU-8J8E (“In [the Baganda kinship] system, all brothers of the father are 
called ‘father,’ all sisters of the mother are called ‘mother,’ all their children ‘brother’ and ‘sister.’”). 
 149 See Gamm, supra note 4 (profiling the Ningatoloum children, who spent nearly four years 
apart from their mother after being separated during conflict in the Central African Republic). 
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of fraud concerns.150 For example, in an interview, an officer could hear a bene-
ficiary mention a “mother” or “father” that is not the petitioner and conclude that 
the child is lying rather than referring to a member of her extended family.151 
These discrepancies might be easily explained, but the denial system prevents 
refugees from challenging or appealing an officer’s findings until months later, 
when the petitioner receives the NOID from the USCIS Service Center.152 
This lack of notice or in-country review can penalize refugees with bona 
fide relationship claims.153 Moreover, the policy of returning files to the United 
States for denial creates headaches for all parties.154 Refugees are not notified of 
the reasons for the proposed denial and must scramble to gain even basic infor-
mation about their applications.155 They must also make difficult life choices 
about what to do next: where to live, what plans to make, and what they have to 
do to see their relatives again.156 
The file-return policy is also more cumbersome for immigration officials, 
who are burdened with more paperwork.157 Consular officers must package and 
return files to vast USCIS Service Centers, where files may sit for months with-
out adjudication or notice to petitioners.158 Once a file does arrive at an adjudica-
tor’s desk, officers must determine what happened in the interview and prepare a 
NOID.159 These NOIDs at last allow the petitioner to rebut the adverse findings, 
but many months may have passed by the time the petitioner receives the no-
tice.160 If a petitioner succeeds at rebutting a claim of fraud or inadmissibility, 
the entire process begins again: USCIS reviews and approves the petition, then 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See Nafziger, supra note 137, at 54 (pointing out that despite officers’ expertise, budget and 
time constraints give them little leeway to carefully investigate close cases involving potential fraud). 
 151 See id. 
 152 See 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O §§ 706.2–.3 (mandating the physical transfer of files back 
to the United States for Service Center review). 
 153 See Dobkin, supra note 142, at 113–14 (highlighting the frustration that many of the author’s 
clients face when confronted with visa denials despite their bona fide relationships); Telephone Inter-
view with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (echoing this same frustration with her clients). 
 154 See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (describing the despair her 
clients face in knowing that the process may be delayed another six to twelve months following an 
unsuccessful visa interview). 
 155 See 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O § 706.2-5(B)(c) (requiring written notice of denial to an 
applicant but not requiring a disclosure of reasons for denial). 
 156 See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (citing examples of clients 
facing these kinds of difficult life decisions). 
 157 See AFM, supra note 42, § 21.10(e)(3); 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O § 706.2-5(B)(c). 
 158 See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40. In the majority of visa revoca-
tion cases handled by the Elon Humanitarian Immigration Clinic, staff have had to contact congres-
sional constituent services staff to prompt the Service Center to find and review the file. Id. 
 159 See AFM, supra note 42, § 21.10(e)(3) (providing instructions to USCIS officers for the han-
dling of the development of adverse information following the petition’s original approval). 
 160 See id. (giving petitioners the choice of withdrawing the petition or having an eligibility de-
termination made based on the facts at hand); Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 
40 (indicating that months might have passed before a NOID is received). 
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forwards it to the National Visa Center (“NVC”), which forwards it to the consu-
late to contact the visa beneficiary, which can add many more months to the pro-
cess.161  
 In the meantime, beneficiaries will have been forced to remain in-country, 
oftentimes in the capital city where the consulate is located, waiting for word on 
next steps.162 This can be disorienting and dangerous, and may prevent reunifica-
tion from happening altogether.163 By the time the consulate receives the file 
with the written rebuttal from the petitioner, there may be new consular person-
nel unfamiliar with the details of the case.164 Scheduling a new interview can 
take many more months, further delaying reunification.165 All of these delays 
add up, and make the process very difficult process to manage with limited in-
formation in unstable circumstances.166 
3. Lack of Counsel for Refugee Derivatives 
In addition to there being a lack of legal assistance domestically, refugee 
derivatives overwhelmingly lack in-country counsel during the Visa-93 (“V-93”) 
process.167 This compounds the difficulties of visa applicants for many reasons: 
the complexity of the legal process, refugees’ low educational levels, and the 
intimidating and high-stakes nature of visa interviews.168 The opportunity to 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See AFM, supra note 42, § 21.10(e)(3); Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra 
note 40. 
 162 See 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O § 705.1 (indicating that beneficiaries must undergo an in-
person interview before visas are issued); Esther’s Story, supra note 1. 
 163 See Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 213, 287 (2003) (describing involuntary separation of families as a “wide-
spread problem” and noting that “some of the most frequent, yet most difficult to resolve, instances of 
family separation occur in the context of immigration and anti-immigration policies . . . [while] [o]thers 
result from wars and refugee crises”); Esther’s Story, supra note 1 (detailing how Esther, a refugee, lost 
contact with her child while pursuing her visa). 
 164 See Michael Gene Edwards, I Am No Longer a Foreign Service Officer, WORLD ADVENTURERS 
(Jan. 4, 2012), http://worldadventurers.wordpress.com/2012/01/04/i-am-no-longer-a-foreign-service-
officer/, archived at http://perma.cc/K4A5-4G4H (explaining that consular officers should “[b]e prepared 
to move frequently. In some cases, this may mean a short tour of one year or less in a conflict zone, a 
short-term assignment, an evacuation, or a reassignment to another post. You will move from place to 
place every two-to-three years, or sooner, unless you can find a different assignment at the same post”). 
 165 See Telephone Interview with Heather Scavone, supra note 40. 
 166 See id. 
 167 See Letter from the Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project to Rachel A. McCarthy, supra note 58 
(addressing “the dearth of attorneys available to refugee applicants abroad”); Telephone Interview 
with Heather Scavone, supra note 40 (explaining that not one of her client’s derivatives have ever 
retained a lawyer abroad for help with interviewing). Recall that “V-93” denotes the visa approval 
process that takes place at U.S. consulates overseas. See supra notes 52–88 and accompanying text. 
 168 See Corneal, supra note 6, at 614 (noting the difficulties of navigating the “labyrinth of immi-
gration law”). 
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have an attorney present during a visa interview is subject to the discretion of the 
consulate, and some refuse to allow attorneys to participate.169  
Furthermore, even when there is counsel to help navigate the V-93 process, 
many times attorneys are not given the information they need to be successful 
advocates.170 The Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project has highlighted the lack of 
counsel afforded to many principal applicant refugees applying for resettlement 
to the United States.171 It notes that the State Department often declines to com-
municate information about a case to the applicant’s legal counsel.172 Although 
visa applications do not have a constitutional right to counsel, allowing refugees 
to have and fully utilize attorneys could help streamline the process.173 
C. No Judicial Review: The Doctrine of “Consular Non-Reviewability” 
One final hindrance to reunification is the lack of judicial review available 
to refugee derivatives whose visas are denied.174 Under the judicial doctrine of 
“consular non-reviewability,” federal courts will not review visa decisions ren-
dered by consular officers to would-be entrants to the United States.175 This doc-
                                                                                                                           
 169 See 1 NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYER’S GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND DEFENSE § 4:145 (2013); see also Refugee/Asylee Family Reunification, EMBASSY OF THE U.S. 
KINSHASA, CONGO, http://kinshasa.usembassy.gov/refugee-family-reunification.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/H8KX-FPXC (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (“You may bring an attorney or family member to 
your interview, but the consular officer may request that the individual not participate in the inter-
view.”). Some may question the purpose of hiring an attorney if he or she cannot participate in the 
most crucial phase of the visa process. See Andrew T. Chan & Robert A. Free, The Lawyer’s Role in 
Visa Refusals, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Apr. 2008, at 1. Consuls have near-absolute authority in visa de-
terminations. See id. This leaves visa applicants with no right to counsel and no real opportunity for 
meaningful visa review. See id. As a result, “a consular visa practice can be a humiliating experi-
ence—with doors to consulates barring entrance to lawyers, visa windows slammed shut, and tele-
phone calls and letters left unanswered.” Id. 
 170 See Letter from Rebecca Heller, Exec. Dir., Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project, Ahilan T. Aru-
lanantham, Dir. of Immigrants Rights & Nat’l Sec., ACLU of S. Cal., & William J. Genego, Supervis-
ing Attorney, Nasatir, Hirsch, Podberesky, Khero, & Genego, to Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. 
Dep’t of State (Sept. 1, 2010) (available at http://refugeerights.org/wp-content/files/
Refugee_legal_counsel_letter.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7XKW-C8DL. [hereinafter IRAP Let-
ter]. 
 171 See IRAQI REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 90.  
 172 See IRAP Letter, supra note 170. 
 173 See Chan & Free, supra note 169, at 3. Even in immigration courts in the United States, immi-
grants have no guaranteed or court-appointed right to counsel. See id. Courts, however, must recog-
nize attorneys if immigrants have the means to retain one. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012); Michael 
Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 114 (2008). 
 174 See Dobkin, supra note 142, at 114 (noting that when a consular officer denies a visa, the 
applicant is generally without any judicial recourse). 
 175 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972) (establishing the doctrine of “consu-
lar non-reviewability” and declining to review a visa denial of Ernest Mandel, a Belgian academic 
who espoused communist ideologies, a ground for exclusion under the immigration laws of the time). 
The Mandel case did carve out an exception to the doctrine of consular non-reviewability: where the 
constitutional rights of a U.S. Citizen are threatened, courts will conduct a “highly-constrained” re-
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trine, rooted in Congress’s plenary power to unilaterally establish its own rules 
for admission and exclusion of aliens, leaves visa applicants with virtually no 
options for challenging or appealing adverse visa decisions.176 Lawsuits chal-
lenging ostensibly unfair visa denials in federal court will generally be dis-
missed, leaving the Executive branch without any reliable check on its power.177 
As a result, consular officers wield enormous, nearly unchallengeable authority 
over an applicant’s prospects for entry to the United States.178 This can lead to 
inconsistent results and is deeply frustrating for applicants and their families.179 
Yet the doctrine of consular non-reviewability ensures that these types of officers 
will continue to receive no meaningful judicial scrutiny or oversight.180  
III. MAKING REFUGEE FAMILY REUNIFICATION WORK: SOLUTIONS  
FOR A MORE EQUITABLE SYSTEM 
For many refugees, the life-changing benefit of resettlement is clouded by 
the arduous and often ineffective family reunification process.181 A number of 
commonsense reforms could bring greater transparency and protection to refu-
gee spouses and children seeking reunification with loved ones.182 Some are 
small and easily implemented, like revisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual.183 
Others, like consular circuit rides to remote areas, would require a greater alloca-
tion of government resources.184 Challenging the doctrine of consular non-
reviewability would require a major victory in the federal courts.185 In this Part, 
Section A advances proposals to help immigration practitioners and advocates 
                                                                                                                           
view to ensure that the consular officer acted on the basis of a “facially legitimate” and “bona fide” 
reason. See Andrew Haile, Comment, Din v. Kerry: A Missed Opportunity to Challenge the Doctrine 
of Consular Non-Reviewability, 19 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 306, 307, 312 (Mar. 15, 2014) (arguing 
that this precedent fails to provide meaningful judicial oversight to counter the unilateral actions of 
consular officers). 
 176 See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766; Dobkin, supra note 142, at 114 (noting that because of the doc-
trine of consular non-reviewability, when a consular officer denies a visa, the visa applicant is “gener-
ally without any recourse”). 
 177 See Dobkin, supra note 142, at 114. 
 178 See Chan & Free, supra note 169, at 1–2 (characterizing this system as “consular absolutism,” 
and noting that consuls have “virtually absolute authority” to make decisions over a visa applicant’s 
case). 
 179 See id.; Dobkin, supra note 142, at 113 (highlighting the frustrations practitioners face in hav-
ing little outlet to challenge denied visa applications). 
 180 See Chan & Free, supra note 169, at 1–2; Dobkin, supra note 142, at 114. 
181 See MARTIN, supra note 8, at 81–84.  
 182 See id. (advocating for increased training of consular officers, changes to Form I-730, and 
processing by an independent “Overseas Processing Entity”). 
 183 See id. at 82–83 (calling for an update of the Foreign Affairs Manual). 
 184 See id. at 106–09 (discussing the challenge of balancing circuit rides for Refugee Corps offic-
ers with the need to maintain security). 
 185 See Dobkin, supra note 142, at 114 (noting that the doctrine of consular non-reviewability has 
been reaffirmed by a number of federal circuit courts). 
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assist refugees to be reunited with their families. 186 Section B offers reforms that 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) should implement to 
streamline the process for the vulnerable.187 Finally, Section C outlines policies 
the State Department should introduce to ensure greater efficacy and accounta-
bility in the V-93 process.188 
A. Advocating for the Vulnerable: Recommendations to Immigration 
Practitioners and Advocates 
Immigration practitioners and advocates play a crucial role in supporting 
refugee reunification.189 Subsection 1 argues that refugees should be given clear 
notice of their right to reunification after arriving in the United States.190 Subsec-
tion 2 calls on the greater legal community to help support this vulnerable popu-
lation through an increase in pro bono representation and the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (“BIA”) Accreditation and Recognition Program.191 Finally, Sub-
section 3 outlines how the doctrine of consular non-reviewability could be chal-
lenged and eventually overturned.192 
1. Provide Refugees with Clear Notice of Reunification Benefits 
First and foremost, refugees must be provided with better information about 
their eligibility for reunification when they are resettled to the United States.193 
This begins with cultural orientation overseas, where refugees selected for reset-
tlement undergo classes and training.194 The caseworkers leading orientation 
should be trained to provide basic information on reunification benefits, includ-
ing what family members are eligible for immediate reunification, how long the 
process might take, and the fact that petitions must be filed within two years of 
arrival.195 Similarly, VOLAGs receiving new refugees should do a better job of 
informing them of reunification benefits.196 Although refugees face many imme-
diate needs, these immediate needs should not overshadow the importance of 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See infra notes 189–226 and accompanying text. 
 187 See infra notes 227–232 and accompanying text. 
 188 See infra notes 233–309 and accompanying text. 
189 See Olivas, supra note 6, at 162. 
190 See infra notes 193–198 and accompanying text.  
191 See infra notes 199–216 and accompanying text.  
192 See infra notes 217–226 and accompanying text. 
 193 See Lunn, supra note 24, at 845–46 (detailing the current process of refugee resettlement and 
describing the role of the different actors, including State Department and nongovernmental organiza-
tion employees who could inform refugees of their eligibility for reunification). 
 194 See id.; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 26 (indicating that most refugees go through a “brief 
cultural orientation” prior to departure for the United States). 
 195 See Lunn, supra note 24, at 845–46. 
 196 See id. at 833–34, 846 (describing the services VOLAGs provide and highlighting one egre-
gious example of negligent casework). 
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being reunited with a spouse or child who remains in a foreign country.197 At a 
minimum, caseworkers should make a point to identify clients with reunification 
needs in their first three months in the United States and make arrangements for 
referrals to legal service providers.198 
2. Address the Lack of Immigration Legal Services for Refugee Family 
Reunification Cases 
The legal community must rise to the challenge of providing adequate legal 
assistance to refugees who need help with family reunification.199 First, law 
firms should contribute more pro bono services to the cause of reunification.200 
Presently, law firms do not provide significant pro bono assistance to refugee 
family reunifications, likely because they are not aware of the need.201 Yet most 
major law firms are firmly committed to pro bono work and allow their attorneys 
to bill pro bono cases like those of paying clients.202 
Refugee family reunification cases could be very attractive cases for law 
firms to take.203 First, attorneys could represent petitioners largely at a distance, 
since the I-730 and V-93 process does not generally require regular contact or 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See id. at 846 (describing some of the needs of refugees upon arrival). 
 198 See id. (noting that caseworkers are funded to assist arriving refugees for ninety to one-
hundred-eighty days). 
 199 See Careen Shannon, To License or Not to License? A Look at Differing Approaches to Polic-
ing the Activities of Nonlawyer Immigration Service Providers, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 446 (2011) 
(highlighting the “severe lack of willing pro bono attorneys” in immigration law in general); Kauf-
man, supra note 173, at 114 (noting that immigration law is “notoriously complex” and that many 
non-citizens lack legal representation). 
 200 See Shannon, supra note 199, at 446. 
 201 See, e.g., 2012 Annual Pro Bono Report, ROPES & GRAY, http://www.ropesgray.com/~/
media/Files/Pro%20Bono/2012%20ProBono.ashx, archived at http://perma.cc/FQJ5-QPEE (heralding 
the firm’s pro bono efforts in areas such as veteran’s disability benefits, voter registration, and asylum, 
but lacking any refugee family reunification cases); Pro Bono Efforts, WILMERHALE, http://www.
wilmerhale.com/probono/#!1, archived at http://perma.cc/FC3H-AVU2 (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) 
(claiming to be a “national leader in our pro bono services and charitable activities” but lacking any 
refugee family reunification cases); Pro Bono Report, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER, & FLOM 
LLP, Summer 2014, http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/Skadden_Pro_Bono_Report.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/3VWJ-2GYV (noting that Skadden “strongly believes” in pro bono work and per-
forms laudable work in asylum cases, but lacking any refugee family reunification cases). 
 202 See, e.g., Pro Bono, GOODWIN PROCTOR LLP, http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Our-Firm/
Pro-Bono.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/KL62-RYXD (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (noting that pro 
bono assistance is “one of the cornerstones of our firm” and highlighting that the firm dedicated more 
than 65,000 hours to 610 matters in the last fiscal year); About Pro Bono at Jones Day: Pro Bono 
Mission and Policy, JONES DAY, http://www.jonesdayprobono.com/mission/, archived at http://
perma.cc/BN3X-2PXW (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (noting that “work performed on approved pro 
bono matters is given the same weight and consideration as client billable work”). 
 203 See JONES DAY, supra note 202 (indicating that the firm already provides pro bono services in 
the protection of children and in combatting human trafficking in Liberia). 
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long interviews with petitioners.204 This would allow attorneys flexibility in the 
time they devoted to cases.205 Second, reunification cases are morally compel-
ling, and provide great satisfaction to advocates and heartwarming narratives to 
highlight in annual reports.206 Refugee service providers should do a better job 
of reaching out to firms with these types of cases.207 
Second, the BIA Accreditation and Recognition program should be ex-
panded and improved.208 This program, which allows non-attorneys to provide 
legal services to immigrants, lends critical support to low-income refugees and 
immigrants who cannot afford to pay private attorneys for immigration assis-
tance.209 Yet at present, the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) 
provides virtually no oversight or training to recognized agencies or their accred-
ited representatives.210 As a result, the quality of the services provided varies 
dramatically from agency to agency.211 EOIR should increase oversight of BIA-
recognized agencies and offer more training to Accredited Representatives.212 It 
                                                                                                                           
 204 See 8 C.F.R. § 207.7 (d)–(f) (2014) (laying out procedures for filing and approval of petitions). 
Attorneys would need to meet with petitioners to fill out I-730 Forms and collect supporting docu-
mentation, but once the petition is filed the bulk of the work is done through communication with 
employees at USCIS and the State Department. See USCIS, FORM I-730, supra note 40, at 1. 
 205 See 8 C.F.R. § 207.7 (d)–(f); USCIS, FORM I-730, supra note 40, at 1–4. 
 206 See, e.g., Gamm supra note 4 (celebrating the reunification of a family from the Central Afri-
can Republic); Veselenak, supra note 89 (discussing the reunion between members of a Kenyan fami-
ly after a ten year wait); Smith, supra note 37 (telling the story of a Togolese couple who were sepa-
rated for years from their six children due to civil conflict). 
 207 See Lunn, supra note 24, at 846 (describing the work of refugee caseworkers). 
 208 See 8 C.F.R. § 292.2 (detailing the rules for BIA accreditation and recognition); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 106. Agencies seeking BIA recognition 
must meet a number of requirements: they must be non-profits, have a “religious, charitable, or social 
services mission,” and either provide free services or charge “nominal” fees. 8 C.F.R. § 292.2. As of 
January 19, 2015, there were 884 recognized agencies, including faith-based resettlement agencies, 
ethnic mutual assistance agencies, and immigration law clinics. Recognized Organizations and Ac-
credited Representatives Roster, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ra/raroster_orgs_reps.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/H44J-6HVM (last 
updated Jan. 19, 2015) (explaining the BIA accreditation and recognition process). 
 209 Ann Naffier, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Nonlawyers? A Study of Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals-Accredited Representatives, Privilege, and Confidentiality, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 583, 589 
(2011) (noting that the accreditation of non-lawyers as BIA representatives has a “specific humanitar-
ian purpose—to ensure immigrants of low financial means have access to legal counsel in their legal 
immigration proceedings”). 
 210 See Shannon, supra note 199, at 450 (noting that regulations of BIA-accredited representatives 
have not substantially changed since 1974 and that DOJ has declined requests for greater oversight). 
 211 See id. at 454 (contrasting the “fine work” of some BIA-recognized agencies with the sad case 
of “Father Bob,” a BIA-accredited representative who was reprimanded by immigration courts for 
failing to provide adequate immigration services to his 761 clients, more than the New York Legal 
Aid Society’s entire immigration unit); see also Sam Dolnick, Removal of Priest’s Cases Exposes 
Deep Holes in Immigration Courts, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A17 (profiling “Father Bob,” the 
Catholic priest and former BIA-Accredited Representative). 
 212 See Shannon, supra note 199, at 483–84 (calling for an increase in training of BIA-accredited 
representatives and their organizations). 
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could do so by mandating an annual or biannual training on immigration law 
basics, and make attendance a requirement of continued agency recognition.213 
At the same time, BIA recognition should be promoted as a way for non-
profits to help meet the significant immigration needs of the refugee communi-
ty.214 This would expand the availability of affordable immigration services and 
enhance accountability for agencies providing them.215 Combined with an in-
crease in pro bono representation from law firms, this strategy could greatly ex-
pand the chances that more refugee families will be reunited through the immi-
gration system.216 
3. Fight for Judicial Review of Visa Denials 
Abolishing or reshaping the judicial doctrine of consular non-reviewability 
could also significantly assist refugees seeking reunification with loved ones.217 
Although convincing federal judges to overturn or modify the doctrine would be 
difficult, immigration practitioners should embrace the challenge.218 Indeed, 
courts have shown a willingness to revisit the doctrine in recent years, increasing 
transparency for visa applicants.219 
Furthermore, the doctrine of consular non-reviewability may be vulnerable 
to challenge.220 As courts frequently point out, consular non-reviewability is 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See id. 
 214 See id. at 482 (advocating for laws that “contain provisions to encourage . . . reputable agen-
cies to seek and obtain BIA recognition and accreditation”). The Immigrant Justice Corps (“IJC”), a 
new initiative seeking to provide free immigration legal services to indigent immigrants facing depor-
tation in New York City, provides a promising model of increased use of BIA-Accredited Representa-
tives. See IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CORPS, supra note 106. The IJC will provide “Community Fellow-
ships” to high-achieving recent college graduates and train them to become BIA-Accredited Repre-
sentatives. See id. Once they receive accreditation, they will provide crucial immigration support to 
the IJC’s staff of immigration attorneys. See id. This is a creative and compelling way to utilize BIA 
Recognition and Accreditation in tandem with full-time immigration attorneys. See id. 
 215 See Shannon, supra note 199, at 481–84. 
 216 See id. 
 217 See Dobkin, supra note 142, at 113–16 (calling for challenges to the doctrine of consular non-
reviewability to provide greater transparency and oversight to consular visa adjudications); Haile, 
supra note 175, at 312 (advocating for courts to review visa denial cases where certain constitutional 
rights of U.S. citizens are at stake); see also Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted 
135 S. Ct. 44 (2014) (chipping away at the doctrine of consular non-reviewability). It remains to be 
seen whether the Supreme Court will increase judicial oversight of consulates or continue with the 
status quo. See id.  
 218 See Dobkin, supra note 142, at 113–16. 
 219 See Din, 718 F.3d at 858 (applying the exception articulated in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
U.S. 753 (1972) to the doctrine of consular non-reviewability and finding that a consulate’s withhold-
ing of information about a visa denial of the Afghan husband of a U.S. citizen did not constitute a 
“facially legitimate” or “bona fide” reason for the denial). 
 220 See id. A more detailed analysis of the strategies for challenging the doctrine are beyond the 
scope of this Note. See id. For a more in-depth discussion of consular non-reviewability, see generally 
Dobkin, supra note 142 (providing an overview of the doctrine).  
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rooted in the doctrine of plenary power, wherein Congress holds exclusive and 
unchallengeable authority to set rules for the inclusion and exclusion of aliens 
immigrating to the United States.221 Some scholars have maligned this doctrine 
for its xenophobic underpinnings.222 It originated in Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, an 1889 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that upheld a law excluding Chinese 
laborers based solely on their national origin. 223 Advocates should challenge the 
doctrine by highlighting these racist policy underpinnings.224 Overturning or 
even modifying this doctrine would allow courts to provide limited review of 
visa denials.225 This would create better accountability for consular officers and 
increase refugees’ chances of having their reunification cases fairly adjudicat-
ed.226 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2009); Bustamante v. 
Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of 
Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 925–26 
(1995) (providing an overview of the plenary power doctrine). 
 222 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Consti-
tutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1998) (noting that “immigration scholars love 
to hate the plenary power doctrine”); Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power over the “Other”: 
Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate Interna-
tional Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 433–447 (2002) (describing various uses of the plenary 
power doctrine over various nationalities); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese 
Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary Power” Justification for on-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 
ASIAN L. J. 13, 13 (2003) (describing the Chinese Exclusion Cases as “a remnant of the racist past of 
Asian exclusion and segregation in America”); see also Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: 
Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 1981–98 (2013) (discussing the plena-
ry power doctrine and its severe limitation of judicial scrutiny of immigration cases). 
 223 See 130 U.S. 581, 581 (1889) (asserting that if Congress “considers the presence of foreigners 
of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and 
security . . . its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary”). For a critique of the plenary power 
doctrine, see Chin, supra note 222, at 3–50; Leon Wildes, Review of Visa Denials: The American 
Consul as 20th Century Absolute Monarch, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 887, 888 (1989) (“The lack of any 
meaningful administrative or judicial review of the denial of United States entry visas is one of the 
major outrages of the American immigration system.”). 
 224 See Chin, supra note 222, at 6–8 (noting that Congress “has not hesitated to use the plenary 
power recognized by the Supreme Court to discriminate”). 
 225 See Won Kidane, The Terrorism Bar to Asylum in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States: Transporting Best Practices, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 300, 322–23 (2010) 
(showing that visa decisions are not subject to review under the doctrine of consular non-
reviewability); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 610 (1990) (noting that the 
major Supreme Court precedents upholding the plenary power doctrine severely limit judicial review); 
Haile, supra note 175, at 312 (advocating for courts to modify the doctrine by allowing judicial re-
view where the “liberty interests” of U.S. citizens are threatened). 
 226 See Dobkin, supra note 142, at 121 (noting that judicial review makes consular officers more 
accountable). 
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B. Recommendations to USCIS: Allowing Greater Flexibility in 
Documentation Requirements 
USCIS should allow more flexibility in evidentiary requirements for refu-
gee petitioners.227 It could accomplish this by placing greater weight on affida-
vits prepared by competent legal counsel.228 Particularly when non-profit attor-
neys or BIA-accredited representatives represent petitioners, officers may take 
comfort that the petitions have received an extra layer of screening, as counsel 
will likely decline to waste precious organizational resources representing peti-
tioners with fraudulent claims.229 Affidavits from community members or 
friends who know the petitioner well can also provide convincing, detailed 
knowledge of the claimed relationship.230 These affidavits should be given more 
weight, particularly where the beneficiaries are living in remote areas or are un-
accompanied minors, since these groups are least likely to have access to formal 
documentation.231 Allowing these affidavits to play a greater role in verifying 
family roles would ease the heavy burden on derivatives to produce frequently 
unattainable primary documentation.232 
C. Recommendations to the U.S. State Department 
The State Department has an outsize role to play in ensuring refugee bene-
ficiaries are not penalized for their vulnerability and lack of resources.233 Sub-
                                                                                                                           
 227 See FORM I-730 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 42, at 3–4 (outlining documentation require-
ments). 
 228 See id. at 4 (describing the criteria for submitting affidavits). 
 229 See id. This may appear to some immigration officials as an overly rosy view of the integrity of 
legal counsel, yet it has merit, particularly where petitioners are represented by non-profits. See Shannon, 
supra note 199, at 454 (noting that there are many “religious and charitable organizations doing fine 
work”). These cash-strapped agencies simply do not have the resources to spend extra time on petitions 
that are clearly fraudulent, and will decline to represent refugees advancing bogus claims. See id. at 455–
56 (describing the overwhelming need for immigration services compared with the small number of 
accredited providers). Furthermore, refugee resettlement agencies that simultaneously provide immigra-
tion services have the benefit of knowing their clients very well, through the reception and placement 
process. See Reception and Placement, U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES & IMMIGRANTS, http://www.
refugees.org/our-work/refugee-resettlement/reception-and-placement-rp/reception-placement.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/XY4Z-PW7U (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (outlining the organization’s many 
activities with recently-arrived refugee families). As a result, they will have better personal knowledge of 
whether a petitioner really has a spouse or child overseas; they will likely have heard the petitioner and 
other refugees from the community speak about it on occasion before. See id. 
 230 See FORM I-730 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 42, at 4; AFM, supra note 42, § 11.1(g) (providing 
consular officers with guidelines for determining the credibility of witnesses in immigration proceed-
ings). 
 231 See Corneal, supra note 6, at 613–14 (noting the vulnerability of unaccompanied minor refu-
gees). 
232 See id.  
233 See generally MARTIN, supra note 8 (addressing a wide range of refugee resettlement 
reforms for the U.S. State Department). 
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section 1 recommends the creation of special fast-track procedures and “consular 
advocate” positions to assist unaccompanied minors.234 Subsection 2 advocates 
the increased use of “circuit rides” to remote locations to interview beneficiaries 
who cannot travel to population centers.235 Subsection 3 calls for more controls 
on the visa denial power of a single officer.236 Subsection 4 advocates enhanced 
training for consular officers who interview refugees.237 Finally, Subsection 5 
champions increased access to counsel for derivatives undergoing consular pro-
cessing.238 
 
1. Create Special Protections for Unaccompanied Minors 
As some of the most vulnerable would-be immigrants in the world, unac-
companied refugee minors deserve higher attention and special protection from 
USCIS and the State Department.239 These applicants must be identified early in 
the immigration process and provided with special accommodations to ensure 
their safety and swift reunification with their parents.240 First, this Subsection 
proposes fast-track procedures for the application and interview processing of 
unaccompanied minors.241 Second, it argues that U.S. consulates should create 
new staff positions tasked with advocating for unaccompanied minors.242 
a. Implement Fast-Track Processing Procedures 
Unaccompanied minors must be identified and prioritized early in the reu-
nification process.243 To accomplish this, USCIS should first amend Form I-730, 
the petition that initiates reunification, to include a box to check—under penalty 
of perjury—indicating that the beneficiary is an unaccompanied minor.244 This 
would be a simple fix as the form is only four pages long and USCIS revises 
many of its forms from time to time in a relatively uncomplicated process.245 
Checking this box would alert the adjudicator to the presence of an unaccompa-
                                                                                                                           
234 See infra notes 239–265 and accompanying text. 
235 See infra notes 266–276 and accompanying text. 
236 See infra notes 277–293 and accompanying text. 
237 See infra notes 294–300 and accompanying text. 
238 See infra notes 301–309 and accompanying text. 
 239 See infra notes 301–309 and accompanying text. 
 240 See infra notes 301–309 and accompanying text. 
 241 See infra notes 243–250 and accompanying text. 
 242 See infra notes 251–265 and accompanying text. 
 243 See Corneal, supra note 6, at 613–14. 
 244 See MARTIN, supra note 8, at 83 (calling for USCIS to change Form I-730 to alert consulates 
that the case is a V-93 application); USCIS, FORM I-730, supra note 40, at 1. 
 245 See Forms Updates, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. http://www.uscis.gov/forms-
updates, archived at http://perma.cc/7NQS-VS68 (last updated Aug. 6, 2014) (providing a month-by-
month update of revised USCIS forms). 
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nied minor and, provided that the petitioner establishes the relationship, would 
place the file on a fast-track.246 
Once the adjudicator approves the petition and places it on the fast-track, 
the file would get priority in the V-93 process.247 This means that clerks at the 
Service Centers, the National Visa Center (“NVC”), and overseas consulates 
would expedite shipment of the case file.248 Again, this would not be an insur-
mountable task since immigration officials routinely expedite case files for a 
variety of reasons, including humanitarian disasters, certain administrative inac-
curacies, and at the request of members of Congress.249 When the file arrives at 
the consular post, officers would immediately prioritize getting in touch with the 
children, schedule interviews as soon as possible, and refer the file to a “consular 
advocate.”250 
b. Provide “Consular Advocates” for Unaccompanied Minors 
U.S. Consulates should employ “consular advocates” to ensure that refugee 
minors are not penalized due to their vulnerability.251 From the moment the con-
sulate receives a V-93 case, these advocates would investigate beneficiaries’ liv-
                                                                                                                           
 246 See id. To provide clarity to petitioners, the Form instructions could also define the term “un-
accompanied minor” as children under 21 (or 18) who are presently living in a different country from 
their parent(s). See FORM I-730 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 42, at 1–3. 
 247 See USCIS, FORM I-730, supra note 40, at 1 (providing a space at the top for USCIS adjudica-
tors to make “remarks” that could include a note about the beneficiary’s status as an unaccompanied 
minor). USCIS Service Centers, the National Visa Center, and U.S. Consulates would have to coordi-
nate amongst themselves to determine what the best mechanism is for alerting clerks to the heightened 
priority. See id. The system already accommodates expedite requests. Expedite Criteria, U.S. CITI-
ZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/forms/expedite-criteria, archived at 
http://perma.cc/H7E4-49WE (last updated June 17, 2011). For example, for cases involving a “hu-
manitarian situation” or “USCIS error,” petitioners may call the USCIS hotline to make an expedite 
request. Id. 
 248 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 248. 
 249 See id. Indeed, each Service Center maintains staff whose sole duty is to respond to congres-
sional inquiries. See USCIS, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/office-legislative-affairs, archived at 
http://perma.cc/PDX7-GAS9 (last updated Jan. 27, 2012) (noting that the “Operations Branch” of the 
USCIS Office of Legislative Affairs “[r]esponds to all Congressional casework inquiries”). One of 
these positions could be tasked with ensuring that unaccompanied refugee minor cases are properly 
flagged and expedited. See id.; see also USCIS to Expedite Review of Certain Cases Affected by Spe-
cific Inaccuracies, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.uscis.gov/
news/uscis-expedite-review-certain-cases-affected-specific-administrative-inaccuracies, archived at 
http://perma.cc/57N8-A3X8 (providing an example of where USCIS expedites certain cases affected 
by administrative errors).  
 250 See MARTIN, supra note 8, at 84 (calling on the State Department and DHS to enact reforms to 
ensure that V-93 cases do not “languish”); see also 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O § 705 (giving con-
sulates instructions for the preliminary processing of V-93 cases). This section could be revised to 
provide new accommodations for unaccompanied minors. See 9 FAM, supra note 55, app. O § 705. 
 251 See Corneal, supra note 6, at 613–14. 
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ing situation, language abilities, and general welfare.252 Where appropriate, they 
could inform the consular officer of the need for accommodation.253 This could 
include, for example, an interpreter in cases where a child lacks fluency in a 
Western language.254 They could also assist with simple tasks like meeting visa 
beneficiaries at the embassy gate and ensuring they do not get hassled by over-
vigilant security guards.255 In especially dangerous situations, they could coordi-
nate safer housing or affordable medical care for minors while they await com-
pletion of case processing.256 
Creating these positions would not have to be difficult.257 Many District At-
torney’s offices around the country now employ victim witness advocates.258 
Their job is to liaise directly with crime victims and ensure that the victim’s 
wishes are adequately expressed in the busy lifecycle of a criminal case.259 A 
“consular advocate” would follow a similar model by meeting with unaccompa-
nied minors and helping ensure that their needs are properly expressed to the 
consulate.260  
Moreover, these positions would not have to be unreasonably expensive: on 
the contrary, the posts would be best staffed by host-country nationals, most of 
whom are paid local wages rather than U.S. diplomat salaries. 261 By employing 
foreign nationals who speak local languages and understand local customs, con-
sulates would ensure that refugee minors have someone with whom they can 
communicate and contact for questions.262 Depending on the consular post, ad-
vocates might also be allowed to accompany refugees to interviews and clear up 
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 253 See id. 
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 262 See id. at 3 (remarking that locally-employed staff are “invaluable” and have “historic refer-
ence . . . contacts and know-how to operate within their country”). 
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simple cultural or linguistic misunderstandings.263 This sort of assistance would 
be invaluable, saving both visa beneficiaries and consular officers time and has-
sle.264 It would also safeguard against tragedies like Esther’s by ensuring unac-
companied minors do not get inadvertently deprioritized.265 
2. Increase Circuit Rides to Remote Locations for Visa Interviews 
To increase accessibility, consular officers should make periodic circuit 
rides to remote locations for visa interviews.266 This is not a new idea, as U.S. 
Refugee Corps officers and United Nations officials already utilize this proce-
dure to interview principal applicants for resettlement.267 When refugees in rural 
locations cannot travel to population centers, these officers will travel to them, 
either via car or small plane.268 This process is crucial for ensuring that all dis-
placed people have an opportunity to be screened for resettlement, and keeps 
refugees from making dangerous journeys in the hopes of getting an inter-
view.269 
Consulates should consider using these measures for certain visa inter-
views.270 To be sure, flying a consular officer hundreds of miles to interview a 
single family for reunification benefits would not be feasible.271 But consulates 
could coordinate with U.S. Refugee Corps officers, brief them on given cases, 
and transfer files to their custody for circuit rides to remote locations.272 Alt-
hough this type of coordination might be time-consuming, it is preferable to 
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forcing vulnerable visa beneficiaries to travel hundreds of miles to unfamiliar 
cities to wait for an interview date.273 
Some advocates have championed videoconferencing as another solution to 
the problem of distant refugee interviews.274 Although this option might be dis-
tasteful for consular officers trained to detect fraud by observing applicants’ 
mannerisms and demeanor, improvements in modern video technology could 
make this a worthwhile—and highly-cost effective—choice.275 Again, given the 
potential travel risks to vulnerable refugees, it remains a commonsense reform 
worth implementing.276 
3. Establish Checks on the Visa Denial Process 
A number of simple reforms to the visa denial process could help refugee 
derivatives avoid the visa denial nightmare.277 First, visa applicants should re-
ceive full notification of the alleged deficiencies in their applications.278 Where 
an officer suspects fraud or detects an inadmissibility issue, refugees should re-
ceive notice of the issue in writing.279 This would require little extra effort on the 
part of the officer, who must already draft a memorandum for USCIS explaining 
the proposed denial.280 The State Department could do this by revising Appendix 
O of Chapter 9 of the Foreign Affairs Manual to require that such written notice 
be sent to the applicant.281 This would help ensure greater transparency for ap-
plicants.282 
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Second, the State Department should reconsider its policy of immediately 
returning files to the United States for reconsideration by USCIS.283 This process 
is time-consuming and can leave applicants in limbo for months without know-
ing what was wrong with their application.284 In lieu of this, consulates should 
establish a system of in-country supervisory review.285 When consular officers 
detect fraud or inadmissibility in a refugee derivative case, they should be re-
quired to submit the file to a supervisor for a second look.286 Where a finding 
appeared to be erroneous, the applicants could be called back in to be re-
interviewed to provide further clarification.287 This would ensure that cases are 
thoroughly examined before sending files back to the Notice of Intent to Deny 
(“NOID”) process.288 Because supervisors would only review a small handful of 
refugee reunification cases, this requirement would be unlikely to place an undu-
ly heavy burden on their caseload.289 
In the event that cases do get returned to USCIS for revocation, Service 
Centers must develop a more effective way to identify them and provide notice 
to petitioners.290 First, consulates should inform beneficiaries directly of the al-
leged deficiencies.291 Second, USCIS Service Centers should ensure that peti-
tioners receive NOIDs in a timely manner, so that petitioners can submit written 
rebuttals to the consulate’s allegations.292 Whatever procedure the Service Cen-
ters devise, it must guarantee that files are received and NOIDs issued in a more 
efficient and timely manner than is done currently.293 
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4. Increase Country-Conditions Training for Consular Officers 
Some of the problems associated with the refugee reunification process can 
be attributed to cultural misunderstandings.294 Consequently, some of these is-
sues could be avoided with better cultural training for consular staff.295 Although 
officers do undergo significant operational training, a number of factors hinder 
their abilities to bridge the vast cultural differences between them and visa appli-
cants.296 Too few possess critical linguistic skills, most live in relative Western 
comfort in capital cities, and relatively few are afforded opportunities to visit 
more remote parts of the country where refugees often live.297 Specialized train-
ing for dealing with victims of persecution could reduce misunderstandings in 
visa interviews by giving officers more insight into refugee cultural practices and 
family dynamics.298 This would not mean that officers would stop screening for 
fraud or rubberstamp every application that appears on their desks.299 But it 
could reduce misunderstanding and ensure that deserving visa applicants get a 
full and fair hearing from a wise and conscientious officer.300 
5. Expand Access to Counsel for V-93 Beneficiaries 
V-93 beneficiaries must also be given greater access to legal counsel for vi-
sa processing and interviews.301 Although this presents challenges for all the 
reasons described above—poverty, distance, logistics—there are several con-
crete steps that consulates should take to ensure that families wishing to be rep-
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resented by counsel have that opportunity.302 First, consulates that have policies 
of barring counsel from visa interviews should reconsider these positions.303 The 
State Department should issue a policy memorandum addressed to all consulates 
instructing them to allow attorney participation in interviews.304 Attorneys could 
help refugees explain their case to officers and better understand the outcome of 
the interview.305 
Second, consulates should identify capable local attorneys and provide visa 
interviewees with a list if they wish to retain legal counsel.306 Although it might 
sound counterintuitive that refugees could afford to retain an attorney, lawyers in 
most developing countries cost a fraction of what they would in the United 
States.307 Even a small sum sent to beneficiaries by the U.S. petitioner could 
help pay for an attorney, and the impact could be dramatic.308 Although most 
refugees traveling to a capital city would probably not know where to find a 
trustworthy attorney, the State Department could help by instructing beneficiar-
ies to visit the consulate once they arrive to obtain a pre-screened listing of im-
migration lawyers.309  
CONCLUSION 
The refugee family reunification system too often fails to provide adequate 
protection to refugee families. Rather than prioritizing the most vulnerable refu-
gee derivatives, the government penalizes them for their inability to self-
advocate. To remedy this problem, this Note advocates for significant reforms to 
the system, starting before petitioners arrive in the United States and continuing 
to the reunification of families at the airport. These reforms target the processes 
used by USCIS, the Department of State, federal courts, and even private non-
profit organizations.  
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Such reforms represent commonsense solutions to a broken system. Too of-
ten we fail to protect the most vulnerable in their attempts to be reunited with 
long-lost loved ones. Finding solutions to these problems would ensure that “the 
least of these” among us are welcomed and cared for: surely a worthy goal for a 
great nation of immigrants desiring to welcome new peoples to their shores. 
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